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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
he EU has been a pioneer in global efforts to combat climate change 
through its decision to use a cap-and-trade system, with the aim of 
reducing greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions by 20% by 2020. This 
target could reach as high as 30% depending on other countries’ 
commitments. The EU emissions trading system (EU ETS) in its current 
form is already imposing costs on industry in the EU and these costs can be 
expected to increase under the post-2012 regime that the EU has in 
principle already decided upon. Other developed countries such as the US 
are widely expected to introduce a cap-and-trade system as well, but most 
emerging economies have no intention to follow any time soon.  
The UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) 
states that developed and developing countries have “common but 
differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities”. There is a 
consensus that developed countries must reduce their emissions first – 
reflecting both the principles of historical responsibilities and capabilities – 
while at the same time developing countries need to put into place 
measures to curb their emissions, yet falling short of introducing economy-
wide, legally binding commitments, such as an emissions cap. Developing 
countries are wary that an economy-wide cap would undermine economic 
growth, for example, by restricting the use of coal, which in many cases is 
domestically available. The recent offer from the Chinese government to 
reduce the emissions intensity of its economy by 40-45%,1 but rejecting any 
                                                      
1 The official letter to the UNFCCC Secretariat, states: “China will endeavour to 
lower its carbon dioxide emissions per unit of GDP by 40-45% by 2020 compared to 
the 2005 level” (see “Appendix II – Nationally appropriate mitigation actions of 
developing country Parties”, available at http://unfccc.int). 
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overall ceiling, suggests the limits o f  w h a t  i s  a c c e p t a b l e  t o  m a j o r  
developing countries. 
A global cap-and-trade system encompassing all major emitters is 
thus at this stage not possible. Hence, large differences in the price of 
carbon, both explicitly and implicitly, are likely to persist.  
From a purely economic perspective, a straightforward way to move 
towards a global, ‘level’ pricing of carbon would be for the EU to impose an 
import tax on the content of CO2 of all goods imported into the EU from 
countries that do not have their own cap-and-trade system or equivalent 
measures. The main argument for such a move is that such a ‘carbon’ 
import tax would establish a ‘shadow’ carbon price even in the rest of the 
world. 
This study analyses the economic and political consequences of such 
a tax and whether it would be compatible with WTO rules. The major 
findings are: 
1.  A CO2 border tax or import tariff would increase global welfare. 
2.  Such a carbon import tariff can be made to be compatible with WTO 
rules. 
3.  There are no insurmountable practical obstacles to introducing such a 
tariff. 
4.  The equity concerns of the UNFCCC could be taken into account by 
rebating the proceeds of the tariff to those countries manifestly 
unable to shoulder the burden themselves. 
These four points are linked and require some background, which is 
presented below. 
1)  Justification for a carbon import tariff 
This is the fundamental point of this study in many respects. Simple 
modelling shows that a carbon import tariff is a useful complement to a 
domestic ceiling on emissions, as provided for in the EU ETS. The intuition 
behind this general result is clear: an import tariff improves global welfare 
because it transfers, at least partially, via trade flows, carbon pricing even 
to those parts of the world where governments have so far refrained from 
imposing domestic measures of any magnitude. In other words, it creates a 
mechanism that enforces the pass-through of carbon costs across the globe, 
therefore making domestic consumers pay the full cost of carbon. A key 
effect of such a tariff is that it would always lower global emissions. This is a CLIMATE CHANGE AND TRADE | 3 
 
very general result, which does not depend on what specific model one has 
in mind since a carbon import tariff would reduce EU imports of energy-
intensive goods, thus reducing emissions abroad. Since the ETS provides a 
ceiling on emissions in Europe, it follows immediately that a carbon import 
tariff will lead to a fall in global emissions. 
By contrast, a ‘stand-alone’ EU ETS risks being ineffectual because the 
ETS will lead to higher production of energy-intensive goods and thus 
higher emissions in countries without a carbon price (resulting in so-called 
‘carbon leakage’). The available evidence on the importance of carbon 
leakage is sketchy. Studies focusing on the limited number of energy-
intensive industries have generally found a low potential for carbon 
leakage, but this is due to the importance of sectors whose output is not 
traded intensively, such as electricity and cement. However, the potential 
for carbon leakage increases considerably if one takes into account the fact 
that all products from the sectors covered by the ETS are important inputs 
throughout the economy (i.e. counting the embedded carbon). Studies that 
take these indirect channels for carbon leakage into account arrive at much 
higher estimates.  
The potential for carbon leakage is a key unresolved empirical issue 
because, as shown below, it is possible that a ‘stand-alone’ ETS is not only 
ineffectual, but actually leads to higher global emissions if production 
abroad is more carbon-intensive than in the EU. 
Another way to transfer the price signal on carbon to the rest of the 
world would be via the generalised use of the so-called ‘Flexible 
Mechanisms’, such as the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) under 
which credits valid under the domestic ‘cap-and-trade’ system can be 
earned from projects in developing countries that reduce emissions below 
baselines. However, as developed below, the CDM, while useful in many 
instances, cannot on its own establish a global shadow price for carbon 
given the lack of scale and problems with host-country control. 
2)  WTO-compatibility 
The preceding result is a key condition to make border measures 
compatible with the basic rules of the World Trade Organisation (WTO). In 
general the WTO rules are very restrictive on any border measure, but 
Article XX (g) provides for a general exemption for measures “relating to 
the conservation of exhaustible natural resources if such measures are 
made effective in conjunction with restrictions on domestic production”. In 4 | EXECUTIVE SUMMARY AND KEY MESSAGES 
 
the specific case of a border tax on the CO2 content of an imported good, 
the EU can argue that this benefits the atmosphere and that the EU already 
has domestic restrictions on domestic production. This double requirement 
cannot of course be invoked by other countries that do not have a domestic 
carbon price and hence should not pose a danger of triggering a 
generalised trade war. 
Other conditions for WTO-compatibility are:  
•  The tariff rate on any product should not be higher than its carbon 
content times the difference between the carbon price in the EU and 
abroad. Products from the US would thus not be taxed if the US 
introduces its own cap-and-trade system with a similar target – 
leading to a similar carbon price – to that adopted in Europe.  
•  The carbon tax should be revenue-neutral: revenues collected from 
the carbon tax should be used to create a fund to finance the 
transition of energy-intensive indus t r i e s  a n d  t o  i n v e s t  i n  n e w  
technologies for climate change not only in the EU but globally and 
distributed according to the UNFCCC criteria of ‘responsibility’ and 
‘capability’.  
3)  Practical implementation  
Imposing an import tariff on the CO2 content of imports is widely 
considered unrealistic because it would be difficult in practice to measure 
the CO2, or carbon footprint of all products. However, the exercise of 
calculating a product’s carbon footprint is becoming more and more 
common, and an objective norm is already developing in the form of ISO 
14067, which can serve as the ‘external’ benchmark required by WTO rules.  
Pressure from the market where consumers want to be informed 
about the carbon footprint of the products they buy has already led to 
initiatives by major multinational retailers to provide this information. 
Since a large part of consumption goods are imported from major emerging 
markets, this implies that producers in China, for example, will in many 
cases have to publish the carbon footprint of their products in order to get 
them on the shelves in supermarkets in the EU. As this trend will continue, 
the practical problems of implementing a carbon-based border measure 
should diminish over time and should not be considered an 
insurmountable obstacle. CLIMATE CHANGE AND TRADE | 5 
 
4)  Differentiated responsibilities and comparability of efforts remain 
important issues  
The UNFCCC lays down the principle of “common but differentiated 
responsibilities and respective capabilities”. This means that developed 
countries (‘Annex 1’ under the Kyoto Protocol) have more responsibility 
than developing countries (‘Non-Annex 1’ under the Kyoto Protocol) and 
should take the lead in climate action. That much is generally agreed. 
However, with China overtaking both the US and the EU as a source of 
CO2 emissions and with developing countries projected to be responsible 
for some three-quarters of primary energy demand growth by 2030, global 
climate change targets can only be met if developing countries start 
implementing strong climate policies now.  
So far developing countries have been willing only to consider 
bottom-up approaches based on domestic policies and measures reflecting 
their own national circumstances and priorities. As long as these countries 
are not willing to discuss common indicators for comparability of efforts 
with developed countries, or among themselves, it is doubtful that the 
bottom-up approach will lead to meeting global climate change targets. A 
second-best tool could be found in a shadow carbon price set through 
border measures. 
However, the equity concerns implicit in the ‘differentiated 
responsibilities’ should be addressed. The most straightforward way to do 
so would be to rebate the proceeds of the import tariff according to the 
UNFCCC criteria of “responsibility’ and ‘capability’. Both legal 
considerations under the WTO and the equity concerns expressed by the 
UNFCCC would thus point in the same direction. The equity argument is 
simply that for the poorest countries a domestic cap-and-trade system (or 
carbon tax) would have unacceptably negative consequences for growth. In 
this case the proceeds collected by the EU at the border could be spent in 
these countries on further mitigation efforts. These rebates should be 
additional to any funding to be agreed anyway in the global negotiations. 
More in general, the UNFCCC also raises the issue of the 
comparability of efforts. This has a number of dimensions. It is widely 
estimated that developed countries will need to spend about 1% of their 
GDP on energy savings and other mitigation efforts. What level of effort as 
a share of GDP should be considered ‘equivalent’ for a developing country? 
Moreover, how can one compare a cap-and-trade system to a commitment 6 | EXECUTIVE SUMMARY AND KEY MESSAGES 
 
to invest huge sums in renewable energy? Should one compare the 
expenditure or the impact in terms of emissions avoided?  
These four key issues, inter alia, are discussed in detail in this report. 
It is organised along the following lines: 
•  Chapter 1 provides a general introduction to the overall issue. 
•  Chapter 2 provides an overview of EU strategy for climate policy 
beyond 2012. 
•  Chapter 3 contains a detailed discussion of the impact of border 
measures on global welfare on the basis of a general theoretical 
model. 
•  Chapter 4 then discusses, on the basis of the results of chapter 2, 
under what conditions a border tax on the CO2 content of imports 
would be compatible with WTO norms. 
•  Chapter 5 attempts to find out the extent to which commitments 
already taken or about to be adopted elsewhere might be comparable 
to what is planned for the EU. 
•  Chapter 6 describes the weaknesses of the enforcement mechanism of 
the Kyoto Protocol. 
•  Chapter 7 concludes with some general considerations.  
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1.  INTRODUCTION  
ombatting climate change (or rather preventing an excessive 
warming of the earth) is now a key policy issue in most parts of the 
world. A series of major international scientific reports has 
highlighted the likely costs resulting from the increase in global 
temperatures that will follow from an unrestrained increase in the 
emissions of greenhouse gases (GHGs). Governments have taken notice, 
and, especially in Europe, they are increasingly willing to take action to 
combat emissions of the most important greenhouse gas, namely CO2 (Box 
1.1), which this report uses as a proxy for all GHGs.  
 
Box 1.1 The role of CO2 
That GHG emissions are causing global warming is now well established. In its 
latest assessment – Fourth Assessment Report (AR4) – the Intergovernmental 
Panel on Climate Change (IPCC, 2007) observed that the warming of the climate 
system is “unequivocal” and that “most of the observed increase in global 
average temperatures since the mid-20th century is very likely due to the 
observed increase in anthropogenic greenhouse gas concentrations." Hence, 
reducing GHG emissions would help to address “dangerous climate change”.  
The Kyoto Protocol covers six greenhouse gases: CO2, CH4, N2O, HFCs, 
PFCs and SF6. Often GHG emissions are expressed as CO2. Although, 
technically speaking, GHG emissions are expressed in CO2eq, CO2 can be used 
as a rough proxy. CO2 emissions are easier to calculate and monitor than many 
others. In addition CO2 is by far the most important source of GHG emissions. 
CO2 contributes approximately 80% of total global GHG emissions, methane 
14% and N2O 8%, while the industrial gases account for 1% of total GHG 
emissions (see Figure 1.1).  
While most of the CO2 emissions stem from fossil fuel burning, a 
considerable share – roughly one-fifth of that – is emitted by land use, land-use 
change and forestry (so-called ‘LULUCF’), i.e. deforestation, forest degradation 
or agricultural land degradation. If one included agriculture and deforestation 
fully in emissions budgets, Indonesia e.g. would rank among the top-five 
emitting countries of the world. Similarly, for Brazil, CO2 emissions from land-
use changes, i.e. deforestation, account for 40% of the total. In developed 
countries CO2 from fossil fuel burning accounts for 80% on average. 
C 8 |INTRODUCTION 
 
Figure 1.1 Share of different anthropogenic GHGs in total world emissions in 2004 
in terms of carbon dioxide equivalents (CO2-eq)  
 
 
Source: Adapted from IPCC (2007, p. 5). 
 
1.1  The EU as the first mover 
There is general agreement among economists (and other experts) that the 
most cost-effective way to lower CO2 emissions is to have a ‘carbon price’, 
i.e. to have a system under which emitters pay for each tonne of CO2 they 
emit. The EU has already put in place, and has been running since 2005, the 
most important carbon trading system in the world, the EU Emissions 
Trading System (EU ETS), which provides such a price. The EU ETS is a 
cap-and-trade scheme: it caps the total GHG emissions from the covered 
sectors and allocates allowances to emit that can be traded within the 
scheme. Thus the ETS establishes a benchmark carbon price which covers 
somewhat less than 50% of EU CO2 emissions from power and industry 
sectors, including process emissions.  
The Kyoto Protocol set up three flexible mechanisms: the Clean 
Development Mechanism (CDM), Joint Implementation (JI) and 
international emissions trading (AAUs trading), which at the time of the 
agreement had been seen as a nucleus of a global carbon market and price. 
The CDM is a mechanism that allows the creating of credits (Certified 
Emissions Reductions or CERs) in developing countries to be generated by 
investment in carbon-reduction projects to offset emissions in capped 
countries. The JI is a similar mechanism but applicable to developed 
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countries with a cap. The reason for this mechanism has been that what 
were then Economies in Transition (EITs), such as Russia or Ukraine, have 
been allocated excess emissions rights, thereby removing any incentive to 
reduce economy-wide emissions. Finally, international emissions trading 
describes the possibility for governments to ‘trade’ or better ‘exchange’ the 
emissions rights that have been allocated to them under the Kyoto Protocol. 
While the CDM has been a moderate success in stimulating some low-
carbon investment in developing countries, it hardly could fulfil the 
objective to create a global carbon price given its limited scale. To date, all 
CDM projects together are reckoned to have generated some 450 million 
tonnes of reductions of CO2eq annually. This is small compared to global 
emissions of about 49 billion tonnes of CO2eq. 
International Emissions Trading has been even more limited. As a 
government-to-government mechanism, it could never create a global 
carbon market given the limited number of participants. While the current 
climate change negotiations are considering scaling up the volume of 
flexible mechanisms essentially by streamlining existing mechanisms, CDM 
and JI, and adding new ones aimed at expanding the scope of emissions 
sources, it is highly unlikely that these mechanisms will achieve the scope 
required to provide a viable carbon price signal. 
The EU has decided that it will keep and expand in scope the trading 
scheme under the so-called ‘post-2012 regime’. The EU ETS for the third 
phase (2013-20) will significantly contribute to the EU 20-20 targets: by the 
year 2020, total GHG emissions not only from ETS but also non-ETS sectors 
should be reduced by 20% compared to the 1990 level. This commitment 
translates into a 21% reduction from 2005 for the ETS sector. For more 
details, see chapter 2. EU targets outside the ETS sectors are not always 
underpinned by a general price signal, but are supposed to be reached by a 
wide variety of national subsidies (e.g. renewable energy feed-in tariffs or 
quotas) and direct regulations (e.g. on energy efficiency). However, some 
member countries (e.g. Sweden and possibly also France) have also 
introduced wider carbon taxes that cover all non-ETS consumption of fossil 
fuels, thus implying that practically all domestic sources of CO2 are subject 
to a price signal. 
1.2  … to be reproduced in the US? 
Until some time ago, it was considered as very likely that the US would 
soon take similar steps (probably with a cap-and-trade system) under the 10 |INTRODUCTION 
 
Obama administration. Whether this will happen any time soon is difficult 
to predict now, however. The American Clean Energy and Security (ACES) 
Act (the Waxman-Markey bill), which the House passed in June 2009, 
envisages the establishment of an economy-wide GHG cap-and-trade 
scheme, including a number of cost-containment measures such as offsets. 
However, this act still has to pass the Senate and will likely be changed 
substantially before it is approved. However, there is wide agreement in 
the US that any US cap-and-trade system would be complemented by 
‘border measures’ to level the playing field and limit carbon leakage. 
1.3  But what about the rest of the world? 
The EU and the US together account for about one-third of global emissions 
(and a similarly large share of global oil consumption), but they alone 
cannot deal with the problem since the emerging economies are quickly 
catching up in terms of CO2 emissions as well (with China alone already 
today a larger source of CO2 emissions than the EU or the US). 
Since EU leaders seem determined to go ahead with some stringent 
post-Kyoto regime and the US is likely to follow suit, the key issue for 
European policy-makers (and industry) will thus be the participation of 
emerging economies in carbon pricing. 
This problem has both a micro- and macroeconomic dimension.  
The micro dimension concerns the impact of the EU (and the US) on 
specific, energy-intensive industries. The representatives of industry in 
Europe have so far taken the position that they support cap-and-trade 
systems, but that industry must be given free CO2 allocations as long as 
major competitors, including emerging economies, do not face a similar 
carbon price. These concerns have been largely taken on board as over 160 
manufacturing sectors, accounting for almost 80% of emissions, are likely 
to receive free allocations because they are considered at significant risk of 
leakage. 
However, the free allocation of allowances represents merely 
redistribution within the EU. The shadow price of carbon will remain and 
would even do so under – hypothetical – full free allocation to most of 
manufacturing as long as the emissions allowances can be traded and fetch 
a positive price. In this case, even free allowances entail an opportunity 
cost. This implies that production and hence carbon leakage could still 
substantially undermine the effectiveness of the ETS. CLIMATE CHANGE AND TRADE | 11 
 
As shown below, there are strong reasons to believe that unilateral 
measures by the EU or the US will be of limited usefulness (and may 
p o s s i b l y  e v e n  b e  c o u n t e r p r o d u c t i v e ,  o r  v e r y  c o s t l y )  a s  l o n g  a s  m a j o r  
emerging economies, such as China, do not put in place equivalent 
measures. Concerns about carbon leakage will not go away until the latter 
makes a voluntary move.2 This is why in both in the EU and the US there is 
a discussion on ‘border measures’, i.e. carbon tariffs against ‘non-
participating’ countries.  
The macro issue is that the relative weights among the major emitters 
are changing quickly. With the EU and US (and other OECD countries) 
likely to agree on reduction (targets) of around 20% or more by 2020 while 
emissions in emerging markets continue to grow exponentially, it is clear 
that attention has to shift to the major future emitters in the developing 
world. Given the dominance of China among the emerging economies, 
both in terms of the absolute level of its emissions and its growth rate, the 
key issue is thus essentially how to prevent ‘China leakage’.  
It is widely feared that ‘border measures’, as they are called, would 
lead to a major disruption of the global trading system because they could 
lead to a trade war. This would, of course, be most unwelcome especially in 
the context of the current financial crisis. However, this need not be the 
case. First of all, a border measure would probably be compatible with 
WTO rules, as shown in this study. Thus the EU’s partners would not have 
any legal basis for retaliation. Moreover, the negotiations that are taking 
place following the UN conference in Copenhagen in December 2009 offer 
opportunities to negotiate another solution to ‘leakage’, namely the 
introduction of equivalent measures in China and other emerging 
                                                      
2 A high rate of leakage could actually constitute another argument for unilateral 
measures. Sinn (2008), for example, argues that the only impact of a unilateral 
carbon price in the EU (and the US) would be to lower the price for fossil fuels 
without any impact on the global consumption of fossil fuels and thus without any 
impact on global CO2 emissions. In other words, without border measures there 
might be 100% leakage. However, even if one accepts this argument, the EU (and 
the US) might still benefit from the lower price for imported hydrocarbons (oil and 
gas). A carbon tax at the border would at least serve to lower oil prices even 
further. It is doubtful, however, that the argument advanced by Sinn applies in 
reality. In fact, a carbon tax might actually lead to higher prices for hydrocarbons, 
which generate much less CO2 per energy unit than coal. 12 |INTRODUCTION 
 
economies. The pressure to do so will increase when the US unveils its own 
climate change policy, which is widely expected to contain border 
measures as well. 
It is clear that it would be much better if China and other major 
emerging markets could be persuaded to take their own domestic measures 
to establish a price for carbon, thus avoiding ‘border measures’ altogether.3 
In the context of the Copenhagen Accord, the Chinese government 
confirmed its unilateral pledge in a letter to the UNFCCC Secretariat that 
“China will endeavour to lower its carbon dioxide emissions per unit of 
GDP by 40-45% by 2020 compared to the 2005 level”..4 At first sight, this 
appears to constitute a significant commitment. It is not clear, however, 
whether this implies a major departure from the baseline because the 
emissions intensity of the Chinese economy should be falling in any event, 
as services become relatively more important. Schmidt & Marschinski 
(2009) even suggest that emissions under the target may in fact be higher 
than the business-as-usual projections 5   when existing and recently 
announced measures are taken into account, while the level of absolute 
emissions in 2020 also depends on the GDP growth assumptions (see also 
Chapter 5). It is thus difficult to say whether this target implies a 
meaningful price for carbon. Moreover, it should be pointed out that this is 
a unilateral target and the extent of any international monitoring of China’s 
compliance is unclear. ‘Unilateral’ implies that it might be changed and the 
potential lack of international monitoring means that it will be difficult to 
verify whether it will actually be reached.  
                                                      
3 However, from the point of view of the EU, it might be preferable to have border 
measures because the EU could then keep the tariff revenues, which could be 
substantial. With a carbon tariff of close to 8% (see chapter 7) and EU imports from 
China around €180 billion, the tariff revenue could amount to €14.4 billion per 
annum on Chinese imports alone. 
4 The letter is available at the UNFCCC website (at http://unfccc.int) under the 
heading “Appendix II – Nationally appropriate mitigation actions of developing 
country Parties”.  
5  Projections by IEA (2009b) and EIA (2009) are used, compared to a -42.5% 
emissions intensity target (Schmidt & Marschinski, 2009, p. 11). CLIMATE CHANGE AND TRADE | 13 
 
All in all, it thus appears that it will be difficult to determine whether 
there is at least an implicit pricing of carbon in China (and other major 
emitters). 
1.4  Tariffs are always bad? 
In the academic literature and in the WTO community, there is a strong 
general aversion to the use of any border measures, which are, a priori, seen 
as leading to distortions. The academic community has so far argued 
mostly that border measures are either not really necessary or are largely 
intended to protect special interest groups, which should be avoided in 
general. However, the terms of the debate have so far focused on the wrong 
issues. The basic reason why border measures are desirable is not so much 
because they ‘level the playing field’ (implicitly to protect domestic energy-
intensive industries). Rather, they are desirable from a global welfare point 
of view because they will establish a ‘shadow’ carbon price even in 
countries that do not take any domestic measures to tax CO2 emissions.  
If the EU (or even more so, if both the EU and the US) were to 
introduce import tariffs based on CO2 content, the production of CO2-
intensive goods in China would diminish (and that of other products 
would increase). Border measures in the EU and the US are thus useful in 
lowering the production of CO2-intensive goods relative to those goods 
with a lower CO2 footprint in the rest of the world. This implies that the 
imposition of a border carbon tax by the EU would increase global welfare. 
This argument has so far not been recognised in the literature.  
1.5  The physics and politics of different fossil fuels: 
Hydrocarbons versus pure carbon (coal) 
A key factor affecting the politics of the global discussions on what to do 
about climate change is the fact that the impact of a given price of CO2 on 
the demand for different fossil fuels depends on how much each fuel 
already costs in terms of a unit of CO2 emitted when it is burned. There is a 
huge difference in this respect between hydrocarbons (oil and gas) and 
coal.  
The best way to think about the impact of a carbon tax on different 
fuels is to first calculate how much each fuel costs in terms of tonnes of CO2 
released (when burned). Table 1.1 below shows the relevant parameters at 
current prices. Column 1 shows the unit price (at the end of 2009). The 14 |INTRODUCTION 
 
prices of coal and gas are of course location-specific. We have used here 
average prices for several locations. 
Column 2 then shows the price per ‘tonne of oil equivalent’ (toe), 
which can also be expressed as the price per unit of heat released 
(gigajoules). Column 4 then shows the price per unit of emissions, taking 
into account the fact that different fuels release different amounts of CO2. 
Hydrocarbons derive some of their energy from the oxidation of hydrogen. 
Thus they release much less CO2 per unit of energy created than coal. On 
the decisive metric of cost per unit of emissions, coal costs only around $34 
(per tonne of CO2 released), compared to over $150 for oil and gas.  
This implies that a carbon tax of around $30 per tonne of CO2 would 
almost double the price of coal, but would increase that of hydrocarbons, 
such as oil and gas, by as little as 20% or even less.  
Table 1.1 Calculations for price per tonne of CO2 for major fossil fuels ($) 
 (1) 
Unit 
price 
(2) 
Price 
per toea 
(3) 
Price per 
GJb 
(4) 
Price per 
tonne CO2 
(5) 
Increase in cost with 
$30 CO2 charge 
Oil (per barrel)  75  550  13.1  179  17% 
Coal (per tonne)  90  135  3.2  34  88% 
Gas (per BTU)  8.9  48.3  9.4  166  18% 
a toe = tonne of oil equivalent 
b 1 toe equals 42 gigajoules. 
Source: Own calculations based on BP statistics.  
 
At present prices, one would thus expect little impact on the demand 
for oil and gas from the imposition of widespread carbon pricing. 
However, the use of coal would become much more expensive. This 
implies that countries that rely heavily on coal would be relatively more 
affected by widespread carbon pricing than countries relying more on oil 
and gas. Unfortunately, the world’s two largest emerging markets, India 
and China, rely on coal for most of their electricity generation and for their 
rapidly expanding steel production. To make matters worse, the coal burnt 
is mainly domestic. This might be the key reason why they have refused 
any explicit carbon pricing. 
The absence of an explicit price for carbon throughout the economy, 
or at least in the sectors producing exports, is a key issue as shown in 
Chapter 3. Before going into this issue, Chapter 2 discusses briefly the 
framework for carbon pricing in the EU. | 15 
 
 
2.  EU CLIMATE CHANGE STRATEGIES FOR 
THE POST-2012 PERIOD 
his chapter establishes the context for the discussion about a 
potential EU carbon border tax. The focus is on the structure of the 
EU’s own strategy to limit emissions through the EU ETS, a ‘cap-
and-trade’ system and other measures.  
2.1  The strategic approach  
As early as 1996, the EU adopted a long-term target of limiting the 
temperature increase to a maximum of 2°C above pre-industrial levels. The 
EU target was reiterated over the years, most recently by the European 
Council of 18-19 June 2009 (European Council, 2009, p. 11) and laid the 
basis for domestic policies and measures aimed at mitigation of, and 
adaptation to climate change.6  
The EU’s stance must be understood in the context of the multilateral 
negotiations where the EU has traditionally played an important role. This 
is also the case regarding environmental issues. The EU as well as its 
member states have been actively promoting Multilateral Environmental 
Agreements (MEAs). In the case of climate change, the EU has been 
catapulted into a leadership role after President George W. Bush pulled the 
US out of the Kyoto Protocol. While few would have bet at that time that 
the Kyoto Protocol would survive, active EU diplomacy ensured that 
Japan, Canada and Russia ratified the Protocol, which entered into force in 
2005. The EU adopted numerous legal texts to fulfil its commitments, 
including policies to support renewable energy and to improve energy 
                                                      
6 The following sections in this chapter draw from Egenhofer et al. (forthcoming). 
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efficiency in buildings and transport. However, the centrepiece of EU 
climate change policy has been the EU Emissions Trading Scheme, which 
became operational in 2005 (see sections 2.5 and 2.6). While these and other 
policies have focused on the implementation of the Kyoto Protocol 
commitments, in parallel the EU has been developing a new strategy to 
meet mid- and longer-term climate change objectives, complemented by 
legislation (see sections 2.2 to 2.4). 
An integral part of this strategy has been energy supply security and 
industrial policy considerations. The EU is facing changing conditions in 
energy supply: domestic energy resources are dwindling at the same time 
that government intervention in the energy industry is on the rise in 
precisely those countries that could potentially fill the gap. While many 
supplier countries such as those from OPEC or Russia seem unable to 
increase production due to a lack of investments, the fact that supplies are 
tightly controlled by governments in exporting countries raises the fear of 
‘excessive’ leverage of supplier countries such as Russia. Many reserves 
will take years to develop due to problems of access, investments and 
physical conditions. A prolonged tight market might increase political 
tensions and possibly provoke some sort of ‘resource nationalism’. In such 
a scenario, the EU and its member states have been examining domestic 
and external policy options to move to a more sustainable and secure 
energy supply. This includes, amongst others, investment in renewable 
energy sources, pushing carbon capture and storage (CCS) technology for 
fossil and other fuels and investment in nuclear energy in member states 
that wish to do so. To drive down costs for these technologies, there is a 
need for large-scale deployment. The International Energy Agency (IEA, 
2008, p. 373 and p. 554) makes the case, for example, that renewables 
(except wind) experience significant capital cost reductions for each 
doubling of capacity, such as 15-20% for photovoltaics (PV) and 20% for 
solar water heaters. Pro-active support policies for low-carbon technologies 
are seen as a possible tool to gain leadership in low-carbon technologies. In 
addition, renewable electricity can reduce long-term electricity prices and 
their volatility; the substitution of fossils combined with renewables may 
reduce pricing power by Russia (notably on gas); and the introduction of 
the EU ETS has led to the retention of some of the economic rent of 
producer countries, including Russia. To offset the higher prices both for 
industry and domestic consumers, energy efficiency is a central piece of the 
strategy, certainly for the transition period until new technologies and new 
fuels become available on a large scale. CLIMATE CHANGE AND TRADE | 17 
 
2.2  The climate and energy package 
EU climate change policy is based on the EU’s long-term target to limit 
global temperature increases to a maximum of 2°C above pre-industrial 
levels. The proposed range of a 20 to 30% cut has been derived from the 
recommendation of the 4th Assessment Report by the Intergovernmental 
Panel on Climate Change (IPCC, 2007). The report suggests that keeping 
the 2°C limit within reach would require atmospheric GHG concentrations 
to be stabilised at 450 parts per million (ppm), corresponding to emissions 
reductions from developed countries in the range of 25-40% by 2020 and 
80-95% by 2050 (see section 5.3). The EU has suggested that at the same 
time developing countries as a group will need to limit the growth of their 
emissions to 15-30% below business as usual (European Commission, 2009a, 
p. 5). Research has shown that stabilisation at the required low 
concentration is technically feasible (see e.g. Neufeldt et al., 2009). 
In order to achieve the medium-term GHG emissions reductions 
required of developed countries, the Council of the European Union 
formally adopted an integrated climate and energy package on 6 April 
2009.7 The package intends to operationalise the overall binding targets to 
reduce GHG emissions and to increase the share of renewable energy 
sources in the EU’s energy mix, which were adopted by the European 
Heads of State and Government at their 8-9 March 2007 spring summit 
(European Council, 2007, pp. 12-21), generally referred to as ‘20 20 by 2020’: 
1)  An absolute emissions reduction objective of 30% by 2020 compared 
to 1990, conditional on a global agreement with “comparable” 
commitments from other developed countries as well as adequate 
contribution by “economically more advanced developing countries”, 
and a “firm independent commitment” to achieve at least a 20% 
reduction (European Council, 2007, p, 12); 
2)  a binding target to reach a 20% share of renewable energy sources in 
primary energy consumption by 2020; 
                                                      
7 For a press statement on the Council’s adoption of the ‘climate-energy legislative 
package’ as well as links to all of its elements, see 
http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/en/misc/ 
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3)  a binding minimum target of increasing the share of renewables in 
each member state’s transport energy consumption to 10% by 2020;8 
4)  a 20% reduction of primary energy consumption by 2020 compared 
to projections (non-binding); and 
5)  a call for introducing a mechanism encouraging investment to enable 
the construction by 2015 of up to 12 large-scale power plants for 
CCS.9 
2.3  Implementation  
With the aim to implement these general targets, the climate and energy 
package, adopted on 6 April 2009, contains six key elements:  
1)  a revised EU ETS starting in 2013, which will bring about a 21% 
emissions reduction compared to 2005 in sectors covered by the EU 
ETS (European Parliament/Council of the European Union, 2009a, 
pp. 63-64);  
2)  an ‘effort-sharing’ Decision that sets legally binding GHG emissions 
reduction targets in respective EU member states (ranging from -20% 
to +20%, see Table 2.1) for all sectors not covered by the EU ETS 
(European Parliament/Council of the European Union, 2009b) – such 
as buildings, transport, agriculture and waste which currently cover 
about 55-60% of EU emissions – amounting to an overall reduction of 
10% below 2005 levels by 2020; 
3)  a Directive for the promotion of renewable energy sources, 
introducing differentiated binding national targets for the share of 
renewable energy sources in final energy consumption by 2020 (see 
Table 2.1), amounting to a 20% share for the EU as a whole (European 
Parliament/Council of the European Union, 2009c).  The Directive 
includes a binding minimum target of a 10% share of renewable 
energy, including biofuels in all forms of transport by 2020;  
4)  a Regulation to reduce average CO2 emissions of new passenger cars 
by 2015 to 120g/km and to 95g/km of the new car fleet by 2020; 
                                                      
8 This target initially focused solely on biofuels but was later widened to include all 
forms of energy from renewable sources (see section 2.3). 
9  This formulation was first introduced in the June 2008 European Council 
conclusions (European Council, 2008, p. 12). CLIMATE CHANGE AND TRADE | 19 
 
5)  new environmental quality standards for fuels and biofuels (aimed at 
reducing GHG emissions from fuels by 6% over their whole life-
cycle) by 2020; and  
6)  a regulatory framework for carbon capture and storage (CCS). In 
addition, the EU ETS Directive makes available a specific number of 
allowances from the new entrants’ reserve for co-financing of up to 12 
CCS demonstration plants until the end of 2015 (European 
Parliament/Council of the European Union, 2009a, p. 74).  
Prior to that, the EU had already published the so-called ‘Strategic 
Energy Technology’ (SET) Plan (European Commission, 2007) to strengthen 
research, development and demonstration of new technologies including 
those relevant for addressing climate change, and that is now being 
implemented. 10   Finally, a review of the level and nature of allowed 
subsidies (or ‘state aid’) is ongoing. 
However, at the heart of the agreement are the ‘20 20 by 2020’ targets. 
A single EU-wide cap is placed on GHG emissions from the ETS sector. 
Targets on GHG emissions from non-ETS sectors and on a renewable share 
are set for and differentiated by member states (see Table 2.1). 
EU agreement on hard emissions caps and binding renewable 
obligations for member states has been based on a complex burden-sharing 
system. Hard targets for the EU ETS and the non-ETS sectors as well as for 
renewables have been set on the basis of an ‘efficiency approach’, i.e. 
reflecting a least-cost approach for the EU as a whole, but with some 
adjustment to ensure that costs for member states remain roughly similar in 
per-capita terms. The methodologies for the three targets are as follows:  
•  GHG reduction (‘effort-sharing’) targets. Countries with a low GDP per 
capita are allowed to emit more than they did in 2005 in non-EU ETS 
sectors, reflecting projected higher emissions due to higher economic 
growth. According to European Commission modelling, this 
increases overall EU compliance costs for the 20% GHG reduction 
target by 0.03% of total EU GDP.  
                                                      
10 In October 2009, the European Commission (2009e) released a Communication 
on Investing in the Development of Low Carbon Technologies (SET-Plan) and 
accompanying documents, including an impact assessment, a technology roadmap 
and a document on R&D investment in the SET priority technologies.  20 | EU CLIMATE CHANGE STRATEGIES FOR THE POST-2012 PERIOD  
 
Table 2.1 National overall targets for the share of energy from renewable sources in 
gross final consumption of energy in 2020 and GHG emissions limits in 
non-ETS sectors for the period 2013-20 
Member state  Share of energy 
from renewable 
sources in gross 
final consumption 
of energy, 2005  
Targeted share of 
energy from 
renewable sources 
in gross final 
consumption of 
energy, 2020  
Member state GHG 
emissions limits in 
2020 compared to 
2005 GHG emissions 
levels (from sources 
not covered by ETS) 
Austria 23.3%  34%  -16% 
Belgium 2.2%  13%  -15% 
Bulgaria 9.4%  16%  20% 
Czech Rep   6.1%  13%  9% 
Cyprus 2.9%  13%  -5% 
Denmark 17%  30%  -20% 
Estonia 18.0%  25%  11% 
Finland 28.5%  38%  -16% 
France 10.3%  23%  -14% 
Germany 5.8%  18%  -14% 
Greece 6.9%  18%  -4% 
Hungary 4.3%  13%  10% 
Ireland 3.1%  16%  -20% 
Italy 5.2%  17%  -13% 
Latvia 32.6%  40%  17% 
Lithuania 15.0%  23%  15% 
Luxembourg 0.9%  11%  -20% 
Malta 0%  10%  5% 
Netherlands 2.4%  14%  -16% 
Poland 7.2%  15%  14% 
Portugal 20.5%  31%  1% 
Romania 17.8%  24%  19% 
Slovak Rep   6.7%  14%  13% 
Slovenia 16.0%  25%  4% 
Spain 8.7%  20%  -10% 
Sweden 39.8%  49%  -17% 
UK 1.3%  15%  -16% 
Sources: European Parliament, Council of the European Union, 2009b, p. 147; and European 
Parliament, Council of the European Union, 2009c, p. 46. CLIMATE CHANGE AND TRADE | 21 
 
•  Renewables targets. Half calculated on a flat-rate increase in the share 
of renewable energy and the other half weighted by GDP, modulated 
to take account of national starting points and efforts already made. 
•  In the EU ETS sector. Uniform cap across member states and allocation 
based on EU-wide allocation methodologies. Some 12% of the overall 
auctioning rights will be re-distributed to economically weaker 
member states in Central and Eastern Europe. Another 2% of the total 
auctioning rights will be distributed to eight countries that have 
already achieved significant reductions before 2005.  
In addition to the equity questions, this elaborated impact assessment 
has also been required to examine larger macroeconomic and security of 
energy supply issues.  
2.4  Costs of the integrated package 
The European Commission (2008a, pp. 22-25; 2008b, pp. 159-163) has 
estimated the total direct costs of implementing the two binding targets for 
GHG emissions and estimated renewables at 0.6% of the GDP in the year 
2020, or some €90 billion. However, through the access to offsets under the 
Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) and Joint Implementation (JI) both 
in the ETS and non-ETS sectors, compliance costs were expected to fall to 
0.45% of GDP in 2020 – or roughly €70 billion (European Commission, 
2008b, p. 161). Rising oil prices would also contribute to lower costs. 
Annual GDP growth is estimated to decrease by approximately 0.04-0.06% 
between 2013 and 2020, which would lead in 2020 to a GDP reduction of 
0.5% compared to a ‘business-as-usual’ scenario. These calculations do not 
take into account possible macroeconomic benefits (in the estimated 
magnitude of +0.15% of GDP) from the re-injection of auctioning revenues 
back into the economy.  
In the non-ETS sectors (covering about 55-60% of EU GHG 
emissions), the package permits member states to meet up to two-thirds of 
their emissions reductions by offset credits generated from CDM and JI, i.e. 
CERs (certified emissions reductions) and ERUs (emissions reduction 
units), respectively, allowing eleven countries to use additional offset 
credits, and the remaining part by domestic abatement measures.  22 | EU CLIMATE CHANGE STRATEGIES FOR THE POST-2012 PERIOD  
 
2.5  The EU ETS and the development of international carbon 
markets 
Since the adoption of the original EU ETS Directive in 2003, a broad 
consensus has emerged in the EU to use carbon pricing in the form of 
emissions trading, i.e. a cap-and-trade scheme, as the foundation of its 
climate policy. If properly designed, a cap-and-trade programme creates 
incentives for companies to reduce emissions in the most cost-effective 
way, rewards carbon-efficiency and creates incentives for new and 
innovative approaches to reduce emissions. The incentive for efficient 
abatement will arise from the ‘opportunity costs’ of using allowances. 
Passing through the costs of GHG emissions allowances to consumers will 
create incentives to reduce the demand for GHG-intensive goods. At the 
same time, this will increase producers’ cash flow to invest in abatement 
technologies.  
If all competitors were subject to similar carbon constraints in well 
functioning markets, the EU ETS would be the most suitable tool to achieve 
EU and UN-based targets at the lowest possible costs. However, the 
original design of the system had several flaws, partly but not only because 
of the absence of a global carbon price or at least a global climate change 
agreement.  
The pilot phase from 2005-07 suffered from a number of teething 
problems such as significant delays of registries and National Allocation 
Plans (NAPs),11 inconsistencies in the definitions of installations, as well as 
issues related to monitoring, reporting, verification and data collection. 
However, the most severe deficiencies of the first phase of the EU ETS 
included over-allocation, intensifying the effects of free allocation, 
distorting allocation between member states and generating windfall 
profits for the power sector.12  
•  The existing rules on free allocation of allowances has led to power 
companies charging their consumers as if they were paying a carbon 
price regardless of electricity sources, resulting in billions of windfall 
                                                      
11 Some NAPs were delayed as much as 1.5 years. 
12 See Matthes et al. (2005), Swedish Energy Agency (2006), Ellerman et al. (2007), 
Egenhofer (2007), Ellerman & Joskow (2008) and Ellerman et al. (2010).  CLIMATE CHANGE AND TRADE | 23 
 
profits, estimated to amount to as much as €13 billion annually 
(Martinez & Neuhoff, 2005, p. 67). 
•  One reason for over-allocation was the absence of a hard constraint 
which led to inflated projections (AEA Technology Environment/ 
Ecofys UK, 2006). The combination of modest cuts and inflated 
projections resulted in over-allocation of as much as 97 Mt of CO2 out 
of a total of about 2.2 billion annual EU allowances, i.e. almost 5% of 
total annual allowances (Kettner et al., 2007).  
•  Another reason for over-allocation was an excessive degree of de-
centralisation in the implementation of the EU ETS. This high degree 
of discretion for member states increased complexity, administrative 
burdens and transaction costs while decreasing transparency. It also 
enabled industry to put pressure on governments to hand out as 
many allowances as other governments do.13  
Over-allocation has been addressed for the second phase (2008-12) 
when the European Commission could impose a formula 14 to  assess 
member states’ allocation plans. As a result, the European Commission 
could shave off 10% of member states’ proposed allocations. While the 
expected price for allowances had been around €20-25, the economic 
downturn since 2008 has made prices tumble. The use of the formula has 
been challenged before the European Court of Justice successfully by 
Poland and Estonia, therefore necessitating a new NAP. It is uncertain at 
this moment what the consequences will be. There may not be any 
substantial ones, depending on the positions that member states in 
question take. 
2.6  The EU ETS in the third phase (2013-20) 
Experiences from the initial phases and design flaws have greatly helped 
the  European Commission to propose radical changes to the EU ETS (see 
Egenhofer, 2009).  
                                                      
13 See Zetterberg et al. (2004) and Matthes et al. (2005).  
14  Verified 2005 ETS emissions x GDP growth rates for 2005-10 based on the 
PRIMES model x carbon intensity improvements rate for 2005-10 + adjustment for 
new entrants and other changes, for example in ETS coverage. 24 | EU CLIMATE CHANGE STRATEGIES FOR THE POST-2012 PERIOD  
 
The principal element of the new ETS is a single EU-wide cap which 
will decrease annually in a linear way, starting in 2013, to reach 1,720 
million tonnes of CO2 in 2020. This corresponds to an overall cap being 21% 
lower than the verified emissions for 2005. This linear reduction continues 
beyond 2020 as there is no sunset clause.  
In addition, there are EU-wide harmonised allocation rules, full 
auctioning to sectors that can pass through their costs (e.g. the power 
sector) and partially free allocation to industry based on EU-wide 
harmonised benchmarks. Overall, this could by and large translate into 
50% auctioning, which could equal about €27 billion per annum at a price 
of €30 per tonne of CO2 (see Behrens et al., 2008). 
Starting from 2013, power companies will have to buy all their 
emissions allowances at an auction. The auctioning rate in 2013 for existing 
power generators in some (mainly Eastern European) countries will be at 
least 30% and will be progressively raised to 100% thereafter. This means, 
e.g. that existing coal-fired power plants in Poland still get their allowances 
for free, but that new power plants need to buy them.  
For the industrial sectors under the ETS, the EU agreed that the 
auctioning rate will be set at 20% in 2013, increasing to 70% in 2020, with a 
view to reaching 100% in 2027. Industries exposed to significant non-EU 
competition, however, will receive 100% of allowances free of charge up to 
2020, based on Community-wide benchmarks. The latest indications 
suggest that the majority of manufacturing industry falls into this category 
(see Box 4.4 in Chapter 4).  
Furthermore, 12% of the overall auctioning rights will be re-
distributed to lower per capita member states (10%) and those that have 
undertaken early action (2%). The system will be extended to the chemicals 
and aluminium sectors and to other GHGs (e.g. nitrous oxide from 
fertilisers and perfluorocarbons from aluminium). The EU ETS will also 
include aviation from 2012 onwards. This has raised major disputes with 
the US administration including those on trade matters.  
The left-over CDM/JI credits from 2008-12 can be used until 2020. 
This amounts to approximately 2 billion tonnes. 
The EU ETS Directive allows for linking the EU ETS with other 
emissions trading schemes by different types of linking arrangements, e.g. 
via an international treaty, an international agreement as foreseen under 
EU law and through a reciprocal commitment applied through domestic CLIMATE CHANGE AND TRADE | 25 
 
systems. In essence, over time the EU ETS could link non-EU emissions 
trading schemes, thereby developing the global carbon market.  
There is little doubt about the ETS and its enforcement: EU 
commitments are legally binding under EU law and by and large 
enforceable by the European Commission. Participating companies will 
need to surrender allowances or face penalties and ultimately closure. The 
European Commission can take member states to court if they do not meet 
the absolute reduction targets on GHG emissions from non-ETS sectors. 
Irrespective of a UN-based compliance mechanism, the EU and its member 
states are bound by EU law to achieve their GHG reduction targets. While 
in theory, the EU decision could be reversed, in practice this is extremely 
unlikely given the complicated EU decision-making processes. 
2.7  Concluding remarks 
This chapter shows the complications brought about by the absence of a 
global emissions trading market. It highlights the compromises that have 
been struck to cope with issues such as carbon and production leakage, the 
latter being a politically delicate issue. An extension of the ‘cap-and-trade’ 
approach to the most important emitters would be of course desirable, but 
unfortunately none of the emerging economies, including China, have 
given any sign of willingness to commit to significant reductions in 
emissions, let alone, to adopt the ‘cap-and-trade’ approach. A global 
emissions trading system that would encompass these major sources of 
emissions thus seems a long way off. This raises the central question 
addressed in the remainder of this study: Would a carbon border tax or 
tariff be useful and justified under these circumstances?  
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3.  GLOBAL WELFARE IMPLICATIONS OF 
CARBON BORDER TAXES 
his chapter focuses on the economic mechanisms that allow one to 
compute the welfare consequences of the introduction of a tariff on 
the CO2 content of imported goods in a country that already imposes 
domestic carbon tax. The main finding is that the introduction of a carbon 
import tariff increases global welfare (and not just the welfare of the 
importing country) if there is no (or insufficient) pricing of carbon abroad. 
A higher domestic price of carbon justifies a higher import tariff. Moreover, 
a higher relative intensity of carbon abroad increases the desirability of a 
high import tariff being imposed by the importing country because a 
border tax shifts production to the importing country, which in this case 
leads to lower environmental costs.  
If both instruments, i.e. import tariffs and domestic carbon prices, are 
used to maximise global welfare, the optimal domestic price for carbon 
should be higher than the external effects (assuming that there is no carbon 
pricing in the rest of the world) and the optimal tariff rate would be 
somewhat lower than the domestic carbon price. 
If the importing country has a fixed ceiling on emissions instead of a 
constant carbon price (as provided under the EU Emissions Trading 
System), an import tariff is always beneficial from a global point of view 
and its imposition lowers the domestic carbon price, but less than 
proportionally. 
3.1  Introduction 
The costs and benefits of ‘border measures’ have been extensively 
discussed in the rapidly growing literature on the economics of climate 
change mitigation policies, but most studies concentrate on 
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competitiveness (of energy-intensive industries) and carbon leakage (see 
e.g. Trouser et al., 2008; Veenendaal & Manders, 2008; Mc Kibben & 
Wilcoxen, 2008; Frankel, 2009). Only a few studies examine the 
international trade impacts of a ‘carbon border tax’ (e.g. Hufbauer et al., 
2009) and none looks at the welfare implications from a global point of 
view.  
The purpose of this chapter is thus to provide a solid basis for any 
discussion of the economics of ‘border measures’ to combat climate change. 
Since climate change policy, even when implemented at the national level, 
is motivated by a concern for global (as opposed to national) welfare, it is 
important to adopt the same point of view when discussing so-called 
‘border measures’. 
An important side issue in the discussion about ‘border measures’ is 
the distinction between plain import tariffs (on the carbon content of goods 
imported) and the combination of import tariffs plus export rebates.15  
This chapter focuses on the case where there is no export rebate. The 
model used here has only one good (of which the importing country is a 
net importer), and hence it cannot be used directly to assess the impact of 
the combination of an import tariff plus an export subsidy. However, this 
should not be of major importance given the well-known general result 
from the theoretical literature: a generalised (ad valorem) export subsidy 
coupled with an import tariff is equivalent to a depreciation of the nominal 
exchange rate and thus has no impact in the long run when all nominal 
variables can adjust. 
                                                      
15 The combination of import tariffs and export refunds constitutes what is usually 
referred to as ‘border tax adjustment’ or BTA. Of course, the concept of border tax 
adjustment is not new, but its application to environmental problems is. According 
to the final report of the decisive GATT Working Party (1970), a BTA is defined “as 
any fiscal measure which puts into effect, in whole or in part, the destination 
principle”. The destination principle enables exported products to be reimbursed 
for some or all of the taxes charged in the exporting country and imported 
products to be charged with some or all of the taxes charged in the importing 
country (GATT Document L/3464). Furthermore, the Working Party concluded 
that only certain indirect taxes but not direct taxes (such as social security charges 
and payroll taxes) were eligible for tax adjustment. This conclusion was important 
for the EU as BTAs are widely used by the EU owing to the fact that member 
countries rely on indirect taxes (VAT). 28 | GLOBAL WELFARE IMPLICATIONS OF CARBON BORDER TAXES 
 
By contrast, there is no consensus in the empirical literature whether 
a border tax adjustment is effective or not, i.e. whether it can correct for the 
distortionary impacts of (national) climate mitigation policies that result in 
a loss of competitiveness and carbon leakage. 
A study by Veenendaal & Manders (2008) addresses directly the 
effectiveness of a carbon BTA on competitiveness and carbon leakage for 
the EU, assuming that the EU is the only country to follow this approach. In 
a general equilibrium analysis, they quantify the impact of a number of 
policy scenarios with a specific focus on the energy-intensive sectors 
covered by the EU ETS. They show that when there is no BTA (and no 
equivalent transfer mechanism in the form of a clean development 
mechanism or CDM), production and employment in these sectors are 
negatively affected by the imposition of a domestic tax on carbon (for 
example the ETS). However, the imposition of a BTA (but again no CDM) 
can mitigate the loss of competitiveness: the loss in production and 
employment is halved. The overall welfare effects of the BTA for Europe is 
ambiguous since refunds are found to be welfare decreasing for Europe but 
import levies are welfare increasing. Overall the authors conclude that the 
impact of the BTA is too modest to make its implementation worthwhile. 
McKibben & Wilcoxen (2008) reach a similar conclusion: the benefits from 
the BTA are too small to justify their administrative complexity. In contrast, 
Majocchi & Missaglia (2002) use a general equilibrium model and show 
that BTAs are more likely to produce a better environment and less 
unemployment for the EU-15 member countries. Other empirical studies on 
sectoral impact give support to BTAs: Demailly & Quirion (2005) show that 
the BTA can be effective in preventing carbon leakage in the cement 
industry, whereas Mathiesen & Maestad (2002) follow a similar exercise for 
the steel industry.  
The remainder of this chapter is organised as follows: The next 
section provides a simple illustration of the welfare gain from a carbon 
border tax based on a standard approach which ignores differences across 
countries in terms of their carbon efficiency. Section 3.3 then uses the same 
approach to illustrate a more specific point, namely that the pricing of 
carbon in the EU without a carbon border tax could actually lead to higher 
global emissions. A ‘stand-alone’ ETS might thus hurt global welfare rather 
than improve it. Section 3.4 concludes. CLIMATE CHANGE AND TRADE | 29 
 
3.2  A simple illustration of the welfare gain from the 
introduction of a carbon tariff 
This is a simple partial equilibrium illustration using linear demand and 
supply curves for simplicity to show graphically the impact of a carbon tax 
(i.e. a tariff on the carbon content of imports) on global welfare. As usual, 
the world is divided into two actors: an importing country (or group of 
importing countries) and the rest of the world (RoW).  
Figure 3.1 shows the global demand and supply curves of the good in 
question. Production of the good leads to emissions of CO2 (at a certain, 
given rate per unit). Private producers do not take into account the cost of 
emissions: hence the private supply curve is below the supply curve, which 
takes into account the external impact of emissions. However, unless there 
is further government intervention, the international price of the good in 
question is determined by the intersection of private supply and demand, 
point O on the graph. 
Figure 3.1 Equilibrium without tariff 
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For simplicity, we consider here the simplest case, which is when the 
home country introduces a ‘cap-and-trade’ system, such as the ETS in 
Europe. In this case the global supply curve is ‘kinked’ at the quantity at 
which the ETS limits the amount that can be produced in the home country 30 | GLOBAL WELFARE IMPLICATIONS OF CARBON BORDER TAXES 
 
(given the limit on emissions and the per unit emissions factor). After the 
introduction of the ETS, the world price of the good in question is 
determined then at point A by the intersection between the (‘kinked’, 
private) supply curve subject and the global demand curve. It is apparent 
that the price is higher than before. 
The issue at hand is what happens when the home country 
introduces an import tariff in addition to the ETS. The import tariff 
obviously reduces domestic demand and hence also global demand since it 
does not affect demand in the rest of the world. The import tariff is here 
assumed to be specific, not ad valorem, because it is supposed to correct the 
externality that arises in production. Figure 3.2 shows the resulting 
equilibrium: with the introduction of the tariff, the demand curve shifts 
down and the resulting new equilibrium price is lower than before 
(equilibrium shifts from point A to point E). 
Figure 3.2 Equilibrium with tariff 
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The fall in the international price implies that foreign producers will 
produce less. Given that domestic production is limited by the ETS, global 
production must fall as well. The sum of domestic plus foreign 
consumption must thus also fall. But this is achieved by a rise in foreign 
consumption (since the price falls abroad) and a fall in domestic 
consumption of an even larger magnitude. This shift in consumption is due CLIMATE CHANGE AND TRADE | 31 
 
to the fact that domestic and foreign consumers face a different price if 
there is an import tariff.  
What are the welfare implications of the tariff? The standard welfare 
loss caused by a tariff is the usual triangle (consumer plus producer loss) 
enclosed by points ADE. As is well known, this welfare loss is of second 
order for any ‘small’ tariff. 
In this case, however, there is also a gain due to the global externality 
in production. It is enclosed by the points ABCE (a ‘rectangle’ or 
parallelogram). The net welfare gain from imposing a tariff is given by the 
trapezoid enclosed by the points ABCD. It follows that a small carbon tariff 
must always improve global welfare. 
The intuition behind this result is clear. As long as the tariff is small, 
the reallocation of consumption from consumers at home to consumers 
abroad causes only a loss of second-order importance. But the gain to 
global welfare from lower foreign production is of first-order importance.  
3.3  In the absence of a carbon tariff, a cap-and-trade system can 
be counterproductive 
Another way to illustrate the importance of a carbon import tax in 
rectifying the inefficiency created by the absence of carbon pricing abroad 
is to ask a simple question: Will the unilateral imposition of a ‘stand alone’ 
ETS, i.e. an ETS without border measures, always help the environment? 
The answer seems to be no. Some simple calculations show that it might 
not be unlikely in reality that an ETS without border measures (i.e. without 
a carbon import tariff) leads to higher global emissions. The intuition 
behind this result is straightforward. 
It is clear that a binding cap on domestic emissions will restrict the 
domestic supply of all energy-intensive goods. This implies that the global 
price of these goods must increase, which in turn means that production 
abroad will increase, which of course will lead to higher emissions abroad. 
This phenomenon is called 'carbon leakage' in the parlance of the climate 
change community. 
Most existing analysis of carbon leakage focuses on a small subset of 
energy-intensive sectors (steel, cement, etc.) whose products are often 
traded intensively. The EU has actually defined sectors exposed to a 32 | GLOBAL WELFARE IMPLICATIONS OF CARBON BORDER TAXES 
 
significant risk of carbon leakage mainly in terms of their openness to trade 
and found that about 60% of all ETS sectors (accounting for about 75% of 
emissions) are ‘at risk’.16 This implies that the potential for carbon leakage 
should be widespread. This impression is confirmed by a recent study 
based on a large general equilibrium model which concludes that about 
40% of any reduction in the production of energy-intensive goods in the EU 
would be offset by higher production abroad.17 
However, this focus in much of the literature on energy-intensive 
industries is misguided because it focuses on the wrong issue (the 
competitiveness of particular sectors) and neglects the fact that the output 
of these industries (especially energy and steel) is used throughout the 
economy. Most products that are traded intensively thus incorporate 
substantial amounts of emissions via the energy and the energy-intensive 
                                                      
16 Article 10a of the revised Directive states that a sector or sub-sector is “deemed 
to be exposed to a significant risk of carbon leakage (CL) if: 
•  the extent to which the sum of direct and indirect additional costs induced 
by the implementation of this directive would lead to a substantial increase 
of production cost, calculated as a proportion of the Gross Value Added, of 
at least 5%; and  
•  the non-EU trade intensity defined as the ratio between total of value of 
exports to non EU + value of imports from non-EU and the total market size 
for the Community (annual turnover plus total imports) is above 10%.” 
A sector or sub-sector is also deemed to be exposed to a significant risk of 
carbon leakage: 
•  if the sum of direct and indirect additional costs induced by the 
implementation of this directive would lead to a particularly high increase of 
production cost, calculated as a proportion of the Gross Value Added, of at 
least 30%; or  
•  if the non-EU trade intensity defined as the ratio between total of value of 
exports to non EU + value of imports from non-EU and the total market size 
for the Community (annual turnover plus total imports) is above 30%.  
The Commission’s website (http://ec.europa.eu/environment/climat/ 
emission/carbon_en.htm) reports that 151 of 258 NACE-4 sectors (≈ 60% of all 
sectors) face Significant Risk of CL (SRCL). Sectors deemed exposed to SRCL 
account for ≈ 75% of all GHG emissions by industries covered by the ETS. 
17 See Veenendaal & Manders (2008). Their study arrives, however, at much lower 
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inputs used in their production. Given that it is usually assumed that the 
supply of exports from China and other emerging market economies is 
rather price-elastic, even small changes in relative prices could have a 
considerable impact on trade flows. 
It is well known that carbon leakage undermines the effectiveness of 
any national 'cap-and-trade' system, like the ETS, in reducing global 
emissions. However, it is not widely realised that under certain conditions 
carbon leakage could actually lead to the paradoxical situation in which the 
imposition of an ETS-type cap-and-trade system would lead to an increase 
in global emissions and thus a loss of (global) welfare. 
The mechanism through which this can happen becomes clear once 
one distinguishes between ‘production’ and 'carbon’ leakage. The former 
describes the displacement, at least partially, of domestic production to the 
rest of the world. The latter refers to the amount of emissions avoided when 
domestic production falls relative to the amount of carbon emitted in the 
rest of the world where production goes up. For example, if production 
leakage were to be only 50% (i.e. foreign production increases only by one 
half of the fall in domestic production), global emissions would still 
increase if the carbon intensity abroad is more than twice as high as at 
home. The general point is that the displacement of production, even if 
partial, can lead to an increase in overall emissions if the carbon intensity of 
production in the rest of the world is much higher than at home. 
A key parameter in any judgment of the efficiency of the ETS (and the 
national carbon taxes in France and Sweden) is thus the difference in 
energy (and thus carbon) intensity between the EU and its major trading 
partners. How large is it? The best estimates of the emissions embodied in 
international trade are based on input-output matrices to take into account 
the way energy inputs are used throughout the economy. On this basis, 
Peters & Hertwich (2008) and Weber et al. (2008) suggest that (on average 
for all sectors) each $1,000 of exports from China contains about 2-3 tonnes 
of carbon, which is about four times more than the 0.5 tonnes of carbon 
embodied in $1,000 of exports from the EU or other OECD countries. The 
same sources also show that exports from other emerging markets have 
sometimes even higher carbon intensities than those of China. 34 | GLOBAL WELFARE IMPLICATIONS OF CARBON BORDER TAXES 
 
Another way to provide a crude estimate of differences in carbon 
intensities can be gleaned from the carbon intensity of GDP. 18  This 
approach suggests that the carbon intensity of production is ten times 
higher in Russia than in the EU and six times higher in China. Of course, 
the higher carbon intensities of emerging markets are partially due to their 
different output mix. However, this does not change the basic fact that a 
USD unit increase in exports from China in general embodies four times as 
much CO2 emissions as exports from the EU or the US. Moreover, higher 
exports in general lead to higher income and thus higher GDP and higher 
GDP growth in China is associated with a much higher growth rate of 
emissions. 
Table 3.1 Carbon intensity of exports and GDP in selected key economies 
   CO2 intensity of exports  CO2 intensity GDP 2005 
EU27   0.47  0.43 
US 0.72  0.53 
China   2.46  2.43 
India   2.67  1.78 
Brazil   1.05  0.5 
Russia   3.85  4.4 
Source: Own calculations based on IFM data and Weber et al. (2008). The carbon intensity of 
exports is based on 2002 data. Both intensities are measured as tonnes of carbon per 
$1,000 of exports. 
                                                      
18 The standard objection to the use of the data on carbon intensity per unit of GDP 
(or exports) is that it is naturally (also) a function of the economic specialisation of 
the country concerned. For example, Russia might be very carbon-intensive just 
because its specialisation is the extraction of hydrocarbons. Similarly the high 
carbon intensity of China is (also) a result of its specialisation in energy-intensive 
industrial goods. (Another reason might be the abundance of local coal and 
remaining energy subsidies.) However, a specialisation in energy-intensive 
industrial goods is no reason not to apply the simple rule that CO2 emissions 
should be taxed wherever they occur and whatever the reason. CO2 emissions 
should be taxed the same way whether they are produced in the manufacture of 
industrial goods or the transport of these goods or whether they arise from the 
heating of homes or leisure travel. CLIMATE CHANGE AND TRADE | 35 
 
If one accepts as a benchmark that Chinese production is in general 
about 4 to 5 times as carbon intensive as that of the EU, it follows that the 
ETS might have led to an increase in global emissions if production leakage 
had been only somewhat above 20-25%.19 
A proper welfare evaluation of the economic impact of a cap-and-
trade system like the ETS (or of the more wide-ranging recent French 
proposal to tax all energy inputs, not only in the energy-intensive sectors) 
should also take into account the fact that the displacement of consumption 
and production leads to standard welfare effects. This is done in Figure 3.3 
below, which shows the equilibrium conditions for a (possibly composite) 
good whose production creates emissions and thus an externality. 
Figure 3.3 Effect of ETS with higher carbon intensity abroad 
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The introduction of a domestic carbon price (via a cap-and-trade 
system or by other means) has two effects that must be conceptually 
distinguished:  
                                                      
19 It is of course impossible to determine the marginal carbon intensity for exports 
from emerging economies that are related to the imposition of the ETS in Europe. 
However, the burden of proof should be on those who argue that this marginal 
carbon intensity is much lower than the average measured by aggregate statistics. 36 | GLOBAL WELFARE IMPLICATIONS OF CARBON BORDER TAXES 
 
1)  It reduces global production, from QFTno ETS to QFTETS. This reduction 
in global production increases welfare because at the margin the 
social cost was higher than the (private=social) benefits from 
consumption. The net welfare gain is given by the area (covered by 
little rectangles) enclosed by the points OADE (loss of consumer 
surplus under the line OE but gain of social cost of production below 
the line DG). 
2)  The fact that the domestic price of carbon is higher than the price for 
carbon abroad leads to an increase in the social cost of production 
beyond the point at which the domestic cap or ceiling is reached. 
From this point onwards, the social cost is not only above the one for 
the unconstrained case (i.e. the case without a domestic cap on 
emissions) but also steeper because any additional production has to 
take place abroad. This increases the social cost for two reasons: first, 
the private cost of production is higher because the supply from 
domestic producers cannot increase. Secondly, the external effects 
from producing abroad are higher because the carbon intensity 
abroad is higher. This implies that the (global) social cost of 
producing the reduced quantity QFTETS  is higher by the shaded 
trapezoid enclosed by the points BCGD. 
As drawn, it is clear that an ETS-type cap-and-trade system can 
actually make the world worse off. Whether or not this is the case depends 
of course on the slopes of the demand and supply functions relative to the 
difference between domestic and foreign carbon intensities. 
Gros (2009) shows in the context of a standard, fully specified model 
that a domestic price on carbon can be counterproductive in terms of global 
welfare under the following condition: 
abroad ply of elasticity
demand global elasticity
ensity carbon relative
e at ensity carbon
abroad ensit carbon
_ sup _ _
_ _
int _ _
hom _ _ int _
_ int _
〉 ≡  
As one would expect, carbon leakage is higher the lower the sum of 
the domestic and foreign elasticities of demand and the larger the foreign 
elasticity of supply, adjusted for the size of the foreign country. In other 
words: the introduction of a cap-and-trade system in a small country that 
has a much lower carbon intensity than the rest of the world has a high 
probability of being counterproductive. Moreover, the longer the time 
horizon, the higher should be the elasticity of supply. This implies that 
while carbon leakage might not be important in the short run, it could 
become much more relevant as time goes on. CLIMATE CHANGE AND TRADE | 37 
 
This analysis would of course be relevant, mutatis mutandis, for the 
general carbon tax recently proposed in France, given that that country is 
small relative to the rest of the world. And given that the carbon intensity 
of the French economy is rather low, this measure could thus very well 
have a negative impact on global welfare. Adopting a domestic carbon tax 
at the EU level would not change the conclusion much since the EU also 
accounts for only a limited share of global GDP.  
3.4  Model based analysis confirms these points 
Gros (2009) shows that the simple intuition embodied in the graphs above 
remains valid in the context of a fully specified model of demand and 
supply of a good whose production involves an externality. He uses a 
simple partial equilibrium two-country model to show the impact on trade 
and global welfare of the combination of a domestic carbon tax with an 
import tariff. In this model the world is divided into two actors: an 
importing country (or group of importing countries) and the rest of the 
world (RoW), with potentially differing demand and supply functions as 
well as differing carbon intensities. Within this model one can analyse the 
impact of a ‘border’ tax (or import tariff) in the importing country on world 
production and welfare when production involves an externality 
(greenhouse gas emissions). The results of the model confirm the 
qualitative results illustrated graphically above. 
Moreover, the model-based analysis also allows one to calculate the 
tariff rate that is best from the point of view of global welfare. This yields 
the following additional insights: 
1)  Not surprisingly, the optimal tariff is higher the higher the carbon 
intensity of production abroad. However, the optimal tariff remains 
positive even if the carbon intensity abroad is much lower than at 
home – provided of course that the foreign carbon price is insufficient 
to cover the externality abroad. 
2)  A higher slope of supply function abroad also leads to a higher 
optimal tariff. 
3)  A higher slope of the demand curve at home implies a lower optimal 
tariff. 
4)  Obviously a higher carbon tax abroad (ε*) implies a lower optimal 
tariff.  38 | GLOBAL WELFARE IMPLICATIONS OF CARBON BORDER TAXES 
 
5)  The level of the domestic emissions cap does not directly influence 
the optimal tariff. 
The analysis based on a formal model thus confirms and refines the 
general argument made here, namely that a tariff on the carbon content of 
imports is always welfare-improving in the presence of a domestic carbon 
price. 
3.5  Concluding remarks 
This chapter provides an evaluation of the economic impact of border 
measures in climate change policy from a global welfare point of view. 
Most of the literature has focused on two separate issues, namely carbon 
leakage and the loss of competitiveness of energy-intensive industries in 
countries that introduce limits on emissions. However, climate change 
policy is motivated in the first instance by a concern for global welfare. 
Hence one should not look at these issues from a national or regional point 
of view. 
Moreover, addressing these issues from an economic welfare point of 
view means that one cannot look exclusively at the impact of any one 
measure on the amount of CO2 emissions, but also at the cost of production 
and consumer welfare. 
The results obtained with a simple standard approach are 
straightforward and intuitively clear. Overall, as one would expect, an 
import tariff improves global welfare because this transfers carbon pricing, 
at least partially, via trade flows, even to those parts of the world whose 
governments have so far refrained from imposing any domestic measures. 
The optimal level of the tariff rate (from a global welfare point of view) 
depends on many parameters, such as the elasticities of demand and 
supply, but the key parameter remains the external impact of emissions. 
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4.  COMPATIBILITY OF CARBON BORDER 
MEASURES WITH WTO RULES 
his chapter investigates whether a carbon border tax be compatible 
with WTO rules? It turns out that the answer depends on a number 
of factors. We argue that the qualifying conditions can probably be 
met. Or, to put it differently, one can design an EU carbon border tax that is 
WTO-compatible.  
WTO members are allowed to adopt trade-related measures aimed at 
protecting the environment. However, climate change is not part of the 
WTO’s ongoing work programme and there are no WTO rules specific to 
climate change. Hence one has to look at WTO case law in conjunction with 
its general rules for an evaluation of the WTO compatibility of a carbon 
border tax. The answer depends on the details of its implementation.  
We find in particular that the following points would be crucial to 
ensure WTO compatibility: 
•  The EU carbon border tax should cover all imports and be based on 
their carbon (CO2) content. This has two important consequences: 
first, this is a tax on a ‘process’ not on a ‘product’, second, as this is a 
tax based on a ‘process’, it is origin-neutral, and hence does not 
violate Article I on most-favoured nation (MFN) treatment. 
•  As taxes based on ‘process’ violate Article III (national treatment of 
‘like’ products), the EU has to invoke Article XX (general exceptions) 
(see Box 4.1). Under Article XX, trade-related measures are allowed if 
necessary to protect exhaustible resources or human, animal or plant 
life or health. The EU can argue that a low-carbon atmosphere, necessary 
to avoid catastrophic climate change, should be viewed as an “exhaustible 
natural resource” (as per Article XX (g)).  
T 40 | COMPATIBILITY OF CARBON BORDER MEASURES WITH WTO RULES 
 
•  The rate of tax should be set equal to the difference in the EU price of 
carbon (ε) and foreign price of carbon. Hence, the tax on a product is 
going to be equal to the carbon content times the difference in the EU 
carbon price and foreign carbon price.  
•  The carbon tax should be revenue-neutral: revenues collected from 
the carbon tax should be used to create a fund used to ease the 
transition of energy-intensive indus t r i e s  a n d  t o  i n v e s t  i n  n e w  
technologies.  
•  The methodology used to determine the carbon content of an 
imported product needs to be objective. An ‘external’ benchmark 
method such as the ISO 14067 might work. 
Box 4.1 Article XX GATT/WTO: General exceptions  
Subject to the requirement that such measures are not applied in a manner that 
would constitute a means of arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination between 
countries where the same conditions prevail, or a disguised restriction on 
international trade, nothing in this Agreement shall be construed to prevent the 
adoption or enforcement by any contracting party of measures:  
(b) necessary to protect human, animal or plant life or health;  
(g) relating to the conservation of exhaustible natural resources if such 
measures are made effective in conjunction with restrictions on domestic 
production or consumption;  
(h) undertaken in pursuance of obligations under any intergovernmental 
commodity agreement which conforms to criteria submitted to the 
CONTRACTING PARTIES and not disapproved by them or which is itself so 
submitted and not so disapproved. 
The second bullet point is crucial as it provides the key justification. 
The arguments that increasing atmospheric concentrations of CO2 damage 
the environment and that the absorption capacity of the earth of GHG 
emissions is limited are supported by science and numerous international 
declarations and agreements in the context of the activities of the UN on 
preventing global climate change (including the Kyoto Protocol). Action by 
the EU alone cannot be sufficient to prevent catastrophic climate change 
and efforts by major emerging market economies to curb CO2 emissions are 
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Many of those who consider that border taxes are not compatible 
with WTO rules seem to overlook this point. See for example the following 
quote from Ahner (2009, p. 18): 
The crucial point is that the protection of domestic producers from 
foreign competition is not recognised as a legitimate policy 
objective under WTO law. For the time being, it does not seem that 
the EU will be able to credibly articulate that the measure is 
designed to achieve greenhouse gas reductions. 
The key argument made here is that one can indeed show that its 
measures will achieve a reduction of GHG emissions. 
As described in more detail in chapter 2, the key element of the EU’s 
future climate strategy is the commitment to achieve at least a 20% 
reduction of greenhouse gases by 2020 compared to 1990 levels and in case 
of a conclusion of a comprehensive international climate change agreement, 
a 30% objective. The EU is also committed to honour its engagements 
under the Kyoto Protocol for which the EU has a specific tool that mainly 
affects industry (including power generation), namely the ETS, which has 
operated since 2005. Within this system some 10,000 energy-intensive 
plants can buy and sell CO2 allowances. This system will be maintained in 
future to ensure compliance with the EU’s targets by 2020. 
The ETS increases costs for the sectors that are covered (namely 
power generation, iron and steel, glass, cement, pottery and bricks), which 
might erode the competitiveness of these sectors vis-à-vis countries that 
have no such stringent commitment to combat climate change, such as the 
US and emerging markets. Industry and business associations have 
naturally tended to emphasise this aspect. In the climate change literature 
the concern is not competitiveness, but ‘carbon leakage’, i.e. industries 
relocating to countries where there are no such climate change measures 
and hence a higher carbon intensity leading to the result of overall higher 
global carbon emissions.  
At the political level, trade policy measures such as BTAs (border tax 
adjustments) have been supported, for example, by the French President 
Nicolas Sarkozy, German Environment Minister Sigmar Gabriel and 
Commission Vice-President Günter Verheugen (Quick, 2008). In its 
resolution on Trade and Climate Change, the European Parliament (2007) 
emphasises that the Commission should examine “WTO-compatible 
mechanisms and climate-friendly trade policies” to address such 
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measures should be taken only when alternative measures will be 
ineffective in achieving given environmental objective” and that they 
“should be no more trade-restrictive than necessary to achieve the 
objective”. Consistently throughout the years, European Council 
Presidency Conclusions as well as conclusions from the Environmental 
Councils have listed border measures as a possible tool, if required. 
Neither the idea of a border tax adjustment nor their use is new. In 
fact, border tax adjustments have been in use as early as the 18th century in 
the US. The difference today in comparison with earlier times is that the 
application of border tax adjustment is now rules-based thanks to the 1970 
report of the Working Party on Border Tax Adjustment of GATT. The 
GATT ruling of 1970 on BTAs was initiated as a result of the adoption of 
Value Added Tax (VAT) in the EU in the early 1960s. As the academic 
literature at the time indicated that a VAT based on the ‘destination’ 
principle was trade-neutral, a border tax adjustment that imposed a tariff 
on EU imports and a rebate on EU’s exports was to offer the EU no trade 
advantage (Lockwood & Whalley, 2008). The economic incidence of such a 
tax and an accompanying BTA today is the same, although their motivation 
by environmental concerns is new.  
This chapter makes two contributions.  
First, we base our discussion on the model results in chapter 3, which 
establish that the introduction of an import tariff on the CO2 content of the 
imported goods in the presence of a domestic carbon tax (i.e. the EU ETS) 
unambiguously lowers global emissions. A border tax can thus be 
motivated by appeal to global welfare and not by competitiveness 
concerns. This has important implications as we will show below.  
Second, we examine the WTO compatibility of a concrete border 
measure, namely a tax on the content of CO2 of imported goods without 
any rebate to exports (unlike most existing BTAs). This feature of our 
border measure makes it less ‘protectionist’ and hence more likely to be 
WTO-compliant. This is an important detail that is often overlooked in the 
existing literature on the WTO-compatibility of a carbon border tax 
adjustment. More often than not, the authors do not describe the precise 
design of a carbon border tax whose WTO-compatibility they discuss.20  
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Then we give some background information on the GATT Working 
Party definition of border tax adjustments (BTAs) and the WTO laws they 
are based on. After identifying the GATT rules that any border measure has 
to abide by, we finally discuss the design of a border measure that the EU 
should implement on imports before we conclude with policy 
recommendations. 
4.1  BTAs in the WTO law: A review of the literature 
The WTO rules on BTAs were set in the GATT Working Party report (1970) 
where a border tax adjustment is defined as “any fiscal measure which puts 
into effect, in whole or in part, the destination principle”. Broadly speaking, 
governments can follow either of the following two principles. Following 
the ‘origin principle’ requires that the goods are taxed where they are 
produced, whereas in the case of the ‘destination principle’, goods are 
taxed where they are consumed. Only the ‘destination principle’ requires a 
border tax adjustment. This adjustment requires the refund of previously 
paid production taxes in return for an offsetting tariff on imports. 
From an economist’s point of view, it was long believed that both the 
origin and destination principle were trade-neutral (see Lockwood & 
Whally, 2008 for a recent discussion).21 At the time of the discussion of the 
Working Party on Border Tax Adjustments, it was agreed that the existing 
WTO rules assured trade neutrality of BTAs and hence no adjustment was 
made to the rules. Hence the Working Party agreed that the relevant rules 
that should apply to BTAs were Articles II and III on the import side and 
Article XVI on the export side. 
Concerning imports, Article II gives the right to impose a charge 
equal to an internal tax on an import, whereas Article III ensures that the 
importing country does not abuse this authority by charging an excessive 
sum. The second paragraph of Article III on National Treatment on Internal 
Taxation and Regulation summarises the purpose of this article: “The 
products of the territory of any contracting party imported into the 
territory of any other contracting party shall not be subject, directly or 
indirectly, to internal taxes or other internal charges of any kind in excess of 
those applied, directly or indirectly, to like domestic products.” 
                                                      
21  See Grossman (1980) for a discussion on trade-neutrality of uniform indirect 
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According to Article II on Schedules of Concessions: a charge 
equivalent to “an internal tax imposed consistently with the provisions of 
paragraph 2 of Article III in respect of the like domestic product or in 
respect of an article from which the imported product has been 
manufactured or produced in whole or in part” is authorised. 
Concerning exports, Article XVI on Subsidies outlines that two 
countries trading have to “recognize that the granting by a contracting 
party of a subsidy on the export of any product may have harmful effects 
for other contracting parties, both importing and exporting, may cause 
undue disturbance to their normal commercial interests, and may hinder 
the achievement of the objectives of this Agreement”. Hence, “contracting 
parties shall cease to grant either directly or indirectly any form of subsidy 
on the export of any product other than a primary product which subsidy 
results in the sale of such product for export at a price lower than the 
comparable price charged for the like product to buyers in the domestic 
market.  
Other relevant articles include Article I, which is the Most-Favoured 
Nation clause, Article VI on Anti-dumping and Countervailing Duties and 
Article VII on Valuation for Customs Purposes. Among these, Article I will 
be discussed in detail later. Since concerned parties on the EU’s 
competitiveness suggested the introduction of BTAs, several studies started 
to examine the WTO-compatibility of border measures. Genasci (2008) 
argues that the legality of border adjustments for energy taxes has been an 
unsettled question and the legal uncertainty multiplied when the concept is 
extended to an emissions trading system. He adds that “designing a 
mechanism to adjust the cost of emissions allowances upon export in a 
manner that adequately protects international competitiveness without 
resulting in illegal subsidies would be difficult”. On the import side, it is 
also difficult to determine different emissions costs borne by the same 
industry in different countries. Another study by Biermann & Brohm (2005) 
concludes that despite ambiguity in both GATT rules and case law, if the 
EU had a carefully designed strategy for BTAs, under certain 
circumstances, these measures can be found to be compatible with world 
trade law. However, given the legal uncertainty, there is a high probability 
that affected members of the WTO would challenge such energy tax 
adjustments before the WTO dispute settlement mechanism. Biermann & 
Brohm (2005) use the US Superfund Tax case, the US Ozone Depleting 
Chemicals (ODC) tax and the Tuna/Dolphin and Shrimp/Turtle cases to 
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can be compatible with WTO rules. To assure WTO compatibility, the BTA 
has to be simple to implement and for that it has to “focus on the CO2 
emissions caused by processed materials and a separate treatment of 
electric energy input to take account of regionally varying fuel mixes”. Both 
Biermann & Brohm (2005) and Ismer & Neuhoff (2004) base their 
arguments on competitiveness and carbon leakage. Van Asselt & Biermann 
(2007), on the other hand, look at a range of proposed measures based on 
different criteria, including environmental effectiveness, the need to 
consider differentiated commitment, responsibilities and capabilities, etc. 
The authors conclude that among a wide range of options, border-cost 
adjustments on imports may be feasible, even though their legal and 
political feasibility is unclear. Quick (2008) argues that since the EU ETS is 
not a tax directly levied on domestic products, a border tax on imports or a 
BTA would be considered by the Appellate Body as ‘naked’ discrimination 
for protection of local products. 
To the best of our knowledge, the WTO/UNEP report (2009) is the 
only study to reach similar conclusions as the present report: the WTO does 
not have any clear-cut laws and rules to assess the compatibility of a 
carbon-motivated border tax and hence several different rules have to be 
invoked. Nevertheless, it is possible to design such a carbon border tax. In 
the following section, we discuss in detail each relevant GATT article and 
case law to show how a carbon border tax can be designed to be WTO-
compatible.  
4.2  The relevant WTO regime for a EU carbon border tax 
According to the Marrakesh Agreement, which established the WTO, 
member countries have to follow mutually supportive policies to ensure an 
open and non-discriminatory multilateral trading system and ensure 
protection of the environment and the promotion of sustainable 
development at the same time. As such, the WTO members are allowed to 
adopt trade-related measures aimed at protecting the environment. 
However, climate change is not part of the WTO’s ongoing work 
programme and there are no specific WTO rules related to climate change. 
Although the GATT report draws out a definition and rules for application 
for BTAs, current WTO law is not clear when such measures are motivated 
by environmental protection. Both WTO Director-General Pascal Lamy and 
the Head of the Trade and Environment Committee of the WTO have 
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topics of internal discussion. Rather, the work of the Trade and 
Environment Committee focuses on two specific points where trade policy 
meets climate change: i) the impact of current trade patterns on climate 
change and ii) whether trade policy can be used to fight against climate 
change. In order to establish which articles would apply to a carbon border 
tax, one must start with the discussions of the GATT Working Party. 
The GATT Working Party report (1970) indicates that the relevant 
articles for border tax adjustments (BTAs) can be separated into two parts: 
For the import side of a BTA: 
Article II. Schedules of Concessions and  
Article III. National Treatment on Internal Taxation and Regulation. 
For the export side of a BTA: 
Article XVI. Subsidies apply. 
The Working Party also included Articles I, VI and VII in their 
discussions. However, in the case of a carbon border tax, the relevant 
articles are Articles II and III from the import side, Article I. General Most 
Favoured Nation Treatment and Article XX. General Exceptions.  
The WTO articles that would be applicable for the export side of a 
BTA are not relevant for our analysis as we consider only an import tax 
without an adjustment for exports. This is a key feature of the model 
introduced in chapter 3 which does not include an adjustment on the 
export side. In fact, it should be noted that technically our discussion in this 
chapter is on the WTO compatibility of a ‘carbon border tax adjustment’ 
rather than a ‘carbon border tax’, given we do not foresee adjustment on 
the export side.22  
Each of the articles mentioned above (with the exception of Article 
XX) sets out the rules that a carbon border tax adjustment has to abide by in 
order to be WTO-compatible: Articles II and III define ‘how’ the carbon 
border tax has to be implemented, Article I defines ‘who’ the tax should be 
imposed on and Article XX defines ‘when’ a tax is justified. 
                                                      
22  The WTO/UNEP (2009) report differentiates between a ‘border tax’ and a 
‘border tax adjustment’ as follows: 
A ‘border tax’ is a tax (or customs duty) imposed on imported goods, 
while a ‘border tax adjustment’ is an adjustment of the taxes imposed 
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According to Article II, a carbon border tax cannot violate the EU’s 
WTO market access commitments. GATT Article II prohibits tariffs above a 
ceiling. However, if the EU can argue that the carbon border tax on the CO2 
content of imports is the ‘same treatment’ as an ‘internal measure’ (i.e. a 
border-enforced internal measure), it would not contravene its Article II 
obligations. Thus, the key is that the carbon border tax is going to be 
applied as part of a domestic carbon tax, namely the EU emissions trading 
system (ETS). Provided that the measure is not in violation of Articles I and 
III, it is thus likely to be WTO-compatible. 
Even if a carbon border tax is considered a border enforcement of the 
EU ETS, it cannot treat imported products less favourably than ‘like’ 
domestic products. As a first step, one should clarify what is meant by ‘like’ 
products. According to the Appellate Body, two products are ‘like’ under 
Article III:4 if they are in a ‘competitive relationship’. In this case, even if a 
basic industrial product is produced by two different production processes, 
one being more-carbon intensive, they are still considered ‘like’. Hence, a 
carbon border tax, which is a tax on a ‘process’ not on a ‘product’, would 
violate this clause as it would treat two ‘like’ products differently. During 
the discussion of the GATT Working Party on BTAs, certain gray areas 
were left untouched. One of these sources of ambiguity was the definition 
of a ‘like or similar product’. In the report, the Working Party decided that 
there has been considerable effort spent in the past to arrive at a common 
definition of a ‘like or similar product’, but due to a lack of improvement, it 
was decided that the term should be examined on a case-by-case basis. 
This, in the case of a carbon-motivated BTA, should present the greatest 
challenge.  
Article III also determines that imported goods cannot be treated 
worse than domestic goods. In this case, the EU has to be careful not to 
impose a carbon border tax that exceeds the domestic carbon tax. Here we 
argue that the EU ETS acts like a tax. If one can argue that from an 
economic perspective, the costs and benefits of a carbon price is known, 
then there is little difference between a carbon tax and a cap-and–trade 
system (Bordoff, 2008). In that case, the tariff has to be equal to the price of 
carbon. The question that is often asked at this point is whether or not one 
should adjust (lower) the tariff for the free allowances that the sector 
covered by the ETS receives. In the recent energy and climate change 
package, it was agreed that only 50% of total allowances are to be auctioned 
in 2013. In reality, however, industry sectors such as steel, cement or 
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equivalence of the allowances as a tax. Even if the allowances are received 
free, they can be sold for cash and thus there is an opportunity cost to using 
one to emit a tonne of carbon. Free allocation of allowances can thus be 
viewed as a lump-sum transfer coupled with a tax.  
Genasci (2008) states that due to the novelty of emissions trading it is 
not clear whether emissions trading systems can be coupled with a border 
tax adjustment in a WTO-compatible manner. Free allocation of allowances 
further complicates the case. Genasci (2008) argues that the allowance 
expenses, the variable cost of such allowances over time and among firms 
and sectors taking into account the initial allocation of grandfathered 
allowances should be factored into the equation (i.e. the rate of carbon 
border tax). Paulwelyn (2007) also argues that allowances should become 
part of the calculation for the BTA as it is not the cost of purchasing the 
allowances that matters but the obligation to hold them (i.e. there is an 
opportunity cost to holding the allowances). Although these are reasonable 
arguments, there is another aspect of allowances that requires attention. In 
terms of the WTO compatibility of a border tax adjustment, it may be 
argued that the free allocation of allowances constitutes an illegal subsidy, 
or in WTO language ‘an actionable subsidy’ covered by the Subsidies and 
Countervailing Measures (SCM) Agreement. Under the SCM Agreement, a 
subsidy is defined as a financial contribution and/or a benefit conferred by 
a government to its domestic industries so that a given sector can develop 
with lower production costs (i.e. improve its competitiveness). Under 
Article III.1 of the SCM Agreement, government subsidies that are 
contingent on export performance or the use of domestic over imported 
products are prohibited. A subsidy is said to be ‘actionable’ if it is granted 
to certain enterprises only and if it causes injury to the domestic industry of 
foreign competitors (Article V of SCM). In practice it is difficult to prove 
injury.23  In fact this may be why so far there have been no complaints 
reported to the WTO’s Dispute Settlement Body on EU emissions 
allowances particularly, nor on subsidy schemes that are in place to reduce 
specific industries’ greenhouse gas emissions. Another explanation may be 
the now-expired Article VIII.2c of the SCM Agreement, which allowed one-
                                                      
23 The WTO/UNEP report (2009) states that “even if free allocation of allowances 
are found to be actionable subsidies covered by the SCM Agreement, ‘the adverse 
effects’ would have to be demonstrated for action to be taken by another WTO 
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time subsidies to be introduced to offset increases in production costs of 
firms adjusting to new environmental regulations. The subsidy was limited 
to 20% of the adaptation costs incurred. The SCM is currently under 
negotiation as part of the Doha Round. If and when the Doha Round is 
finalised, this may be one crucial area where the WTO may not only 
contribute to combat climate change but also be made compatible with 
post-Kyoto commitments. However, the introduction of border measures 
will most likely be introduced by full auctioning as the current free 
allocation is transitional and related to fears of production leakage. Full 
auctioning can be introduced very rapidly. 
4.2.1  Establishing the carbon content  
As mentioned above, we argue that the appropriate carbon border tax 
adjustment should be based on the carbon content of the import. As such, 
we diverge from the mainstream literature which concentrates on ways to 
calculate the costs of the emissions trading system – including an 
adjustment for allowances – as mentioned above. According to Article III, 
any WTO-member has the right to impose a tax on imports that is 
equivalent to a ‘internal charge’. However, this is a rather narrow 
perspective to take. We argue that if the carbon border tax adjustment is 
only to be on the imports from the ETS-covered sectors, the efficiency of the 
carbon border tax would be reduced dramatically in terms of its impact on 
global welfare. First, even though de jure ETS covers certain sectors, de facto 
coverage is in direct proportion with the level of vertical integration of ETS-
covered sectors with other domestic sectors. In other words, the ETS has an 
impact also on those industries where e.g. steel or cement is used as an 
input. Second, every country uses a different production process, which 
determines the level of carbon emissions released into the atmosphere from 
an additional unit produced. Hence, the carbon content of a product is the 
appropriate base for a carbon border tax adjustment. To give an example, 
the CO2 content in China’s audio and video equipment exported to the US 
in 2003 was 27.4 MtCO2, whereas for the same quantity of audio and video 
equipment, US exports emitted only 21.2 MtCO2 (Bin & Harriss, 2008). The 
table below shows the difference in the CO2 content of China’s top five 
exports to the US versus the top five US exports to China. This difference is 
largely due to the relatively high use of coal and less efficient 
manufacturing technologies in China.  50 | COMPATIBILITY OF CARBON BORDER MEASURES WITH WTO RULES 
 
Table 4.1 Top five exports in US-China trade, ranked by their CO2 embodiment in 
2003 (MtCO2) 
CO2 emissions embodied in 
Chinese exports 
CO2 emissions embodied in 
US exports 
Audio and video equipment  27.4  Soybeans 1.7 
Games, toys   25.7  Plastics material and resin  1.1 
Other computer peripheral 
equipment 19.4 
All other basic organic 
chemicals 1.1 
Institutional furniture  13.5  Fertilisers 0.8 
Women’s footwear  12.8  Aircraft 0.8 
Total 98.9  Total 5.5 
Source: Bin & Harriss (2008).  
Since the carbon content of a product would be the tax base under a 
border tax, the ‘process’ of production rather than the ‘product’ itself 
becomes important. Related to the discussion on border measures being 
imposed on a ‘process’ and not on a ‘like’ product, WTO case law suggests 
that differentiation between ‘like’ products is not permitted under Article 
III but it can be under Article XX. Basing the tax on the carbon content of 
the product also makes sure that a border tax will be compatible with 
Article I. According to Article I, the EU can not single out countries that are 
not signatories to the Kyoto Protocol. In other words, the EU cannot 
discriminate against an import based on its ‘origin’. In such a scenario, the 
EU may argue that the measure is not imposed based on origin but on 
process. If the EU decides to impose the carbon border tax on only certain 
countries, this is most likely to violate Article I as the MFN obligation is 
unconditional and broad. This could also raise complaints by the affected 
countries on the grounds that the EU’s ETS covers only half the emissions. 
Indeed, from a WTO-compatibility perspective, the low coverage of the EU 
ETS will be problematic.  
One crucial detail in the implementation of a carbon border tax 
adjustment is the methodology to be used for those countries that do not 
provide such information on their exports. Based on the US gasoline case, it 
is likely that the Appellate Body would not allow the EU to use one 
baseline for foreign producers and another for domestic producers. The 
best solution (under WTO compatibility considerations) would be to use an 
‘external’ standard, such as ISO 14067, to calculate the carbon footprint CLIMATE CHANGE AND TRADE | 51 
 
(CFP) of imports. As Radunsky & Laabs (2009) explain, the carbon 
footprint: 
•  refers to the calculation of the amount of GHG emissions associated 
with a company, event, activity, or the lifecycle of a product/service; 
•  enables ascertaining and managing the emissions of GHGs along the 
supply chain; 
•  allows a comparison of the difference of the CFP between different 
products (e.g. oranges and tomatoes), between the same product of 
different producers and between the same product of the same 
producer in different locations/shops; 
•  safeguards the survival of companies in the changing regulatory and 
economic business landscape; 
•  furthers the understanding of the risks and opportunities in the 
supply chain; and 
•  allows focusing of effort in response to new regulatory, shareholder 
and consumer pressures. 
It thereby qualifies as a powerful tool to de-carbonise the supply 
chain of products. 
As the authors argue, there are several initiatives underway (e.g. ISO 
14067, Carbon Disclosure Project, PAS 2050 in the UK, Japan, New Zealand, 
Korea and California and recently, the EU ETS benchmarking exercise) to 
calculate or assess the life cycle of greenhouse gas emissions of goods and 
services. Among these, the ISO 14067 deserves special attention as this can 
provide the EU with the ‘external’ benchmark it needs to use when 
calculating the CFP of imports. 
Many major multinational retailers have already launched bottom-up 
initiatives to measure a carbon footprint of their products (see Box 4.3 
below).  
Box 4.2 Standardisation at ISO 
International standards help to assure quality, allow for comparability and 
contribute to market development. ISO standards are a powerful tool for 
developing global markets and supporting the harmonisation of government 
policies as well as supporting the acceptance of energy-efficient and low-carbon 
technologies and paving the way for the development and use of new 
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ISO/TC 207 “Environmental management” started a process on CFP in its 
meeting in Beijing (July 2007). An important milestone was the agreement on a 
new work item proposal (November 2008) related to the quantification and 
communication of the carbon footprint of products. The two-part standard ISO 
14067 is developed in ISO/TC 207/SC 7/WG 2 “GHG in the value and supply 
chain”. In developing ISO 14067, ISO/TC 207/SC 7/WG 2 can draw on a range 
of standards (e.g. ISO 14040, ISO 14044, ISO 14025, ISO 14064) and the 
experience in their application. 
The development of ISO 14067 faces various challenges. The first is 
practicality. The standard needs to be practical as companies are choosing to 
monitor the CFP of a broad range of thousands of products, including their 
progress towards de-carbonisation on a yearly basis. In addition, there is the 
challenge to combine concepts and the terminology of a range of existing ISO 
standards that have been developed by different working groups. To agree on a 
meaningful communication of the CFP that addresses the needs of purchasers 
and consumers will be challenging.  
The significant engagement, the increasing willingness to follow the 
process and to actively engage in ISO/TC 207/SC 7/WG 2 as well as the 
contribution of highly qualified experts with different backgrounds seem to 
offer a sound basis on which to manage those challenges. It is the common goal 
to make available ISO 14067 as a draft international standard by the beginning 
of 2010 and to issue ISO 14067 one year later by the end of 2011.  
Source: Radunsky & Laabs (2009). 
Box 4.3 Companies measuring GHG emissions in their supply chain 
 
Source: Radunsky & Laabs (2009). 
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Box 4.4 Benchmarking for the EU ETS 
The revised EU Emissions Trading Scheme (European Parliament and Council 
of the EU, 2009a) foresees auctioning of allowances as the default option. 
However, Article 10a of the Directive allows for transitional free allocation to 
industry, based on Community-wide ex-ante benchmarks, which will be phased 
out for sectors not exposed to carbon leakage in steps by 2027 (80% in 2013, 30% 
in 2020). Installations in sectors or sub-sectors deemed to be “exposed to a 
significant risk of carbon leakage” are due to receive as of 2013 up to 2020 
allowances free of charge at 100% of the benchmark.  
The benchmarks will be based on a number of objectives, essentially 
related to providing incentives for GHG reductions and the use of energy-
efficient techniques. The starting point is the “average performance of 10% most 
efficient installations” (in terms of GHG emissions) in a sector or sub-sector in 
the Community in the years 2007-08. Importantly, the farther an installation is 
from the most efficient one in the sector, the less likely it is to receive all of its 
allowances for free. The European Commission has launched a process to cope 
with benchmarking and has contracted a consultant – Ecofys, in cooperation 
with the Fraunhofer Institute for Systems and Innovation Research, and the 
Öko-Institute – to assist in this process.  
Benchmarking offers the possibility to improve performance and inform 
EU and member state industrial policy (e.g. give indications of performance, 
potential, technological challenges, etc.). Benchmarking also offers possibilities 
at the international level. It may: i) become a useful tool to ease the transition to 
a low-carbon economy, ii) help industry to identify technology or performance 
opportunities and/or iii) provide information on best-practice. There might 
even be a possibility to ‘transfer’ the EU or parts of the EU benchmarking 
exercise internationally.  
A list of ‘exposed sectors’, estimated to account for around a quarter of 
emissions covered by the EU ETS and around 75% of the emissions from 
manufacturing industry in the EU ETS, has been drawn up by the European 
Commission (2010a).  
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Box 4.5 Bottom-up approaches to carbon footprint labelling by Tesco 
In the UK, the Carbon Trust, working with Defra (Department for Environment, 
Food and Rural Affairs, now DECC) and the British Standards Institute (BSI), 
has developed a standard methodology for measuring the greenhouse gas 
emissions from products and services, called Publicly Available Specification 
(PAS) 2050. It draws on existing best practice to create a single standard that will 
enable a consistent approach to measuring the embodied greenhouse gas 
emissions from products and services across their lifecycle, and is applicable to a 
wide range of sectors and product categories. It is anticipated that this work will 
be the first step towards an internationally agreed standard for measuring 
greenhouse gas emissions at the product level.  
In 2007 the UK supermarket chain Tesco cooperated with the Carbon 
Trust, the environmental consultancy ERM and a small number of suppliers to 
measure the carbon in a range of products. The group used the methodology set 
out in the existing draft of PAS 2050 to measure the footprint of our products. 
This helped the Carbon Trust and BSI to test the draft standard and [its] work 
has helped inform the further refinement of PAS 2050. 
During October, November and December 2007 [Tesco] measured the 
footprints in five product areas: laundry detergent, light bulbs, orange juice, 
potatoes and tomatoes. [Tesco] held workshops for [its] suppliers to explain life-
cycle data and footprint calculation, consistent with the PAS 2050 standard so 
[Tesco] provided [its] suppliers with guidance documentation and a data 
collection template. [Tesco’s] environmental consultants, ERM, supported [its] 
suppliers through the data collection and footprint calculation process, helping 
the suppliers with any questions they had. Once the results had been calculated 
the work was certified by the Carbon Trust. 
[Tesco] managed to undertake this work with a fast turnaround. 30 
products were measured and certified in 12 weeks. The following table shows 
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Carbon footprint broken down into lifecycle stages (%)   Category and Product   Carbon 
footprint grams 
of CO2e per 
functional unit 
(rounded)  
Production   Distribution   Store   Use   End of life 
waste 
management  
Detergents  
Tesco Non-Biological 
Liquid Capsules  
700g per wash   17%   0.2%   1%   72%   10%  
Tesco Super Conc. 
Non-Bio Liquid Wash  
600g per wash   11%   0.1%   0%   83%   6%  
Tesco Non-Biological 
Liquid Wash  
700g per wash   17%   0.2%   1%   73%   9%  
Tesco Non-Biological 
Tablets  
850g per wash   32%   0.1%   0%   62%   5%  
Tesco Non-Biological 
Powder  
750g per wash   25%   0.1%   0%   69%   6%  
Orange Juice  
Tesco 100% Pure 
Squeezed Orange Juice 
360g per 250ml   91%   1%   7%   0.3%   1%  
Tesco Pure Orange 
Juice From 
Concentrate  
260g per 250ml   88%   2%   9%   0.5%   1%  
Tesco Pure Orange 
Juice (1 litre)  
240g per 250ml   93%   1%   4%   1%   1%  
Tesco Pure Orange 
Juice (3x200ml)  
220g per 250ml   93%   1%   5%   0.5%   1%  
Light bulbs  
60W Pearl Light bulb   34kg per 1000 
hrs of use  
1%   <0.1%   <0.1%   99%   <0.1%  
100W Pearl Light bulb   55kg per 1000 
hrs of use  
1%   <0.001   <0.001   99%   <0.1%  
11W CFL   6.5kg per 1000 
hrs of use  
1%   <0.001   <0.1%   99%   <0.1%  
20W CFL   12kg per 1000 
hrs of use  
2%   <0.001   <0.001   98%   <0.1%  
11W Spotlight   6.5kg per 1000 
hrs of use  
2%   <0.001   <0.1%   98%   <0.1%  
60W Spotlight   34kg per 1000 
hrs of use  
1%   <0.1%   <0.001   99%   <0.001  
Potatoes  
King Edwards 
(2.5 kg)  
160g per 250g 
serving  
33%   1%   3%   56%   7%  
Anglian New (2.5 kg)   140g per 250g 
serving  
34%   1%   3%   58%   4%  
Organic New (1.5 kg)   160g per 250g 
serving  
40%   1%   4%   51%   4%  
Organic Baby New 
(750 g)  
140g per 250g 
serving  
48%   1%   5%   41%   4%  
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After a decision has been made on which outside benchmark should 
be used to calculate imports’ carbon content if they are not already 
provided by the producer, the next step is implementation. Although 
calculating the carbon content of thousands of products from several 
different countries may seem a daunting job, one could argue that it should 
be no more complicated than obtaining a CE marking, for example, to enter 
the EU market.  
The CE marking is a mandatory conformity mark on several different 
products that producers are required to display if the product is to be sold 
in the European Economic Area, or EEA (consisting of three of the four 
EFTA member states – Iceland, Liechtenstein and Norway – the EU-27 and 
the European Community). The CE marking certifies that the product has 
met EU consumer safety, health or environmental requirements. Certain 
aspects of how CE marking is implemented are also appealing for 
enforcement of displaying the carbon content of a product. For example, if 
the producer can identify the directives his product has to be in conformity 
with, he can himself declare the conformity sign. Otherwise, there are 
several consultants who can visit the location of production and certify the 
‘process’ of production (rather than the product) so that the manufacturer 
does not have to obtain a CE marking each time it ships the same product 
to the EU and the EEA market. This can be directly applied in the case of a 
carbon content of a product.  
4.2.2  Article XX  
The key element of the carbon border tax that we are discussing in this 
paper is that the tax has to be levied on the carbon content of an imported 
product; as such, it is not a tax on a ‘product’ but a ‘process’. As discussed 
above, one of the most important questions in the case of a carbon-
motivated tax is to establish whether or not products that are produced 
using different production methods can be considered ‘unlike’. The WTO 
claims: “When comparing two products, different processes or production 
methods (PPMs) used in the manufacture of such products do not per se 
render these products ‘unlike’”. In addition, the WTO rules are clear on 
‘product’ taxes but not on ‘process’ taxes. Hence the legality of BTAs on 
‘process’ taxes is unclear. In the case of a carbon tax of the type considered 
here, the tax is primarily going to be a tax on a ‘process’ and not on a 
‘product’. One way of justifying a ‘process’ method is by using the 
exemptions provided under Article XX.  CLIMATE CHANGE AND TRADE | 57 
 
We showed in chapter 3 that border measures are effective tools to 
fight climate change (i.e. reduce global CO2 emissions and increase global 
welfare). Moreover, one can also argue that a low-carbon atmosphere is an 
‘exhaustible natural resource’ (Article XX(g)) and that numerous 
international agreements have recognised the importance of combating 
climate change.  
Article XX on General Exceptions allows trade restrictions if they are 
necessary to achieve an environmental goal.24  This is crucial because it 
signifies that a carbon border tax whose aim is to increase global welfare 
can be WTO-compatible, but not carbon-related border measures 
motivated by competitiveness concerns.  
Our motivation for a carbon border tax is also different from the 
concerns over ‘carbon leakage’. Several studies indicate that carbon leakage 
in the case of no-border measures is rather small (e.g. Veenendaal & 
Manders, 2008). This can be explained by the fact that according to recent 
figures (European Environment Agency, 2007), 44.1% of the CO2  25 
emissions in 2005 by the EU-27 were accounted for by the non-traded 
sector: 27.4% by transport and 16.8% households and services.26 The figures 
below indicate that while the contribution of the energy industries and 
industry to CO2 emissions has declined slightly over the last decade, the 
contribution from transport has increased considerably.  
                                                      
24 As emphasised in chapter 3, any economic analysis of carbon border measures 
should not only consider CO2 emissions but also the cost of production and 
consumer welfare. Our analysis concludes that an import tariff improves global 
welfare (taking into account also producers and consumer surpluses), as such a 
measure partially imposes carbon pricing in those countries where there are no 
domestic measures. 
25 In this study we strictly refer to CO2 emissions, as the ETS mainly covers CO2 
although greenhouse gas emissions include six gases. The ETS coverage of GHG 
however is likely to change. 
26 Despite the heavy transport costs for the trade in energy-sector products, some 
concerns have been raised within the EU that production facilities may be exported 
to neighbouring countries, e.g. Ukraine. 58 | COMPATIBILITY OF CARBON BORDER MEASURES WITH WTO RULES 
 
Table 4.2 CO2 emissionsa by sector, EU-27 (shares, %) 
   1995  2005 
Energy industries  35.2  34.3 
Industry 23.1  20.9 
Transport 23.3  27.4 
- Road transport  75.5  71.9 
- Civil aviationb 9.9  12.0 
- Navigationb 12.7  14.7 
- Railways  1.0  0.6 
- Other transportc 0.9  0.8 
Households, services, etc.  17.6  16.8 
- Households  11.2  10.5 
- Services, etc.  6.4  6.3 
Otherd 0.8  0.6 
Total 100.0  100.0 
a Including international bunkers but excluding LULUCF (land use, land-use change and 
forestry) emissions. 
b Including international bunkers (international traffic departing from the EU). 
c Includes pipeline transportation and ground activities in airports and harbours. 
d Solvent use, fugitive, waste, agriculture. 
Source: European Environment Agency (2007). 
It has to be noted that the EU ETS does not currently cover the 
transport sector or residential housing. From a legal point of view, it can be 
argued that the measure (i.e. the carbon border tax) is not an effective tool 
to serve its purpose (i.e. reduce CO2 emissions). If the domestic or ‘internal’ 
measure (i.e. the EU ETS) does not address fully or only covers partially the 
major contributing sectors to the problem, the EU is more likely to face 
challenges on any border measure it imposes on other countries.  
The European Commission is contemplating the introduction of EU-
wide carbon taxation in the non-ETS sectors. Such a tax would add explicit 
CO2 tax components to the 2003 Directive on energy taxation. Directive 
2003/96/EC sets minimum tax rates in the member states for the use of 
various fossil-fuel types and of electricity, with no upper limit (Council of 
the EU, 2003). Using rates that have been circulating in early European CLIMATE CHANGE AND TRADE | 59 
 
Commission drafts of €0.01/kg CO2 for heating fuels and either €0.01 or 
€0.03 per kg CO2 for motor fuels,27 depending on their use, would impose 
CO2 cost on the non-ETS equivalent to an emissions price of €10 per tonne 
(and maybe €30 per tonne for motor fuels) which would then affect directly 
the entire EU economy.  
Moreover, the idea of common carbon taxation is starting to attract 
the support of member states as an uncomplicated and cost-effective 
market-based tool for reaching the new non-ETS targets in the climate and 
energy package, for motivating energy efficiency and for raising proceeds, 
while avoiding internal market distortions in case of unilateral taxation in 
some countries only. But the unanimity in the Council of the EU required 
for passing tax legislation may be hard to achieve due to national budget 
peculiarities and concerns over imposing a disproportionate burden in 
poorer countries. But the proposal could be adopted under the ‘enhanced 
cooperation’ clause, which would allow a majority of member states to 
adopt such a law. From the very beginning, the Swedish Presidency made 
clear its support for carbon tax (see Reinfeldt, 2009). The Council of the EU 
and the European Parliament had also previously encouraged carbon 
taxation by stressing the importance of introducing market-based 
instruments, such as taxes, which would be separate from the EU ETS 
permits (Council of the EU, 2007; European Parliament, 2008). Individual 
approaches have been developed by some member states. Carbon taxes 
with generally higher rates than the newly proposed minimum already 
exist in Sweden and Finland and have been recently proposed in France 
(IEA/OECD, 2009; Sarkozy, 2009). 
4.3  Case law 
There is now some evidence that although the WTO rules have not 
changed, the panel rulings on trade and environment cases have started to 
recognise that trade policy can be used to protect the environment. For 
example, the US action against shrimp catchers provides an interesting 
example of justifiable discrimination between products on the basis of 
PPMs to achieve an environmental goal. The case involved the imposition 
of an import ban by the US on shrimp that was harvested by a method that 
                                                      
27 Motor fuels from waste and other residues have been added to the Directive for 
the first time, but are not subject to CO2 tax. 60 | COMPATIBILITY OF CARBON BORDER MEASURES WITH WTO RULES 
 
led to incidental killing of sea turtles. The exporters were exempt from the 
ban if they proved that they caught shrimp by the use of a certain piece of 
equipment that did not threaten sea turtles.  
The EU carbon border taxes can also benefit from the US experience 
with environmental taxation. The Superfund Chemical Excises (1986) and 
the Ozone-Depleting Chemicals (ODC) taxes are two such examples with 
‘process’ BTAs. The purpose of the Superfund tax was to raise revenue to 
clean up the contaminated toxic waste sites, whereas the purpose of the 
ODC tax was to discourage the use of chloroflurocarbon (CFCs) and 
hydrochlorofluorocarbons (HCFCs) by increasing the price of taxed 
chemicals and discouraging their production. Both of these systems of taxes 
have characteristics that may be applicable in an EU carbon-tax system. 
Most importantly, the GATT has approved the system of BTAs on 
process taxes used by the Superfund tax.28 In response to a request from 
Canada, Mexico and the European Union, a GATT conciliation panel was 
formed to examine the consistency of the system of BTAs under the 
Superfund chemical tax with international trade rules. The GATT 
Superfund Panel Report found that for purposes of Article III (national 
treatment of ‘like products) the tax on imports of taxable substances 
manufactured with taxable chemicals did not treat those goods differently 
than similar goods produced in the United States. The panel found that the 
tax was imposed on imported substances because they were produced 
from chemicals subject to an excise tax in the United States and the tax rate 
was determined in principle in relation to the amount of those chemicals 
used and not in relation to the value of the imported substance. The 
conciliation panel approved the system of BTAs on taxable substances 
based on the actual consumption of taxable chemicals in their production, 
and the system of imputation based on the predominant method of 
manufacture. However, it rejected the fallback BTA of 5% of the value on 
the grounds that it imposed a higher tax on imports than on similar 
domestic production. 
                                                      
28  GATT Panel Report, United States - Taxes on Petroleum and Certain Imported 
Substances, L/6175, BISD34S/136, 154 ff., adopted on 17 June 1987. CLIMATE CHANGE AND TRADE | 61 
 
4.4  Key elements for the design of a WTO-compatible EU carbon 
tax 
Based on the above arguments, a WTO-compatible EU carbon tax should 
have the following main features:  
•  The EU carbon border tax should be a tax on all imports29 and the tax 
b a s e  s h o u l d  b e  t h e  c a r b o n  c o n t e n t  o f  t h e  i m p o r t e d  p r o d u c t .  T h i s  
already introduces two important characteristics of a compliant 
border measure: first, it is a tax on a ‘process’ and not on a ‘product’; 
second, as this is a tax based on a ‘process’, it is origin-neutral, and 
hence it does not violate Article I (MFN treatment). 
•  Since taxes based on ‘process’ violate Article III (national treatment of 
‘like’ products), the EU has to invoke Article XX (general exceptions). 
Under Article XX, trade-related measures are allowed to protect 
human, animal or plant life or health. Therefore, the EU can argue 
that the import border tax (as per chapter 3) can increase global 
welfare by directly curbing CO2 emissions globally. More specifically, 
the EU can argue that a low-carbon atmosphere, necessary to avoid 
catastrophic climate change, should be viewed as an “exhaustible natural 
resource” (as per Article XX (g)) (Bordoff, 2008). The panel outcome on 
the US gasoline case states that clean air is a resource susceptible to 
depletion. 
•  The rate of tax should be set equal to the difference between the EU 
price of carbon (ε) and the foreign price of carbon. Hence, the tax on a 
product is going to be equal to the carbon content times the difference 
in the EU carbon price and foreign carbon price.  
•  The border tax should tax the manufacturer or the importer at the 
point of the first sale or use of the imported product. The border tax 
should apply to all products as all products emit carbon during the 
production process. However, to reduce the administrative burden of 
the border measure, a threshold level for carbon-content of the 
product may be introduced.  
                                                      
29 Some countries may challenge the EU by arguing that the EU ETS now covers 
only 50% of the CO2 emissions. However, the EU can argue that other initiatives de 
facto provide a full coverage.  62 | COMPATIBILITY OF CARBON BORDER MEASURES WITH WTO RULES 
 
•  The carbon tax has to apply to the first domestic sale and use of the 
‘product’ (referred to as product Q in the model) which produces a 
negative externality. As such, the EU carbon tax should be a carbon 
tax collected at the importer level and therefore the EU carbon tax is 
subject to a border measure. 
•  The carbon tax should be revenue-neutral: revenues collected from 
the tax should be used to create a fund that will be used to ease the 
transition of energy-intensive indus t r i e s  a n d  t o  i n v e s t  i n  n e w  
technologies.  
•  The tax should be collected at first domestic sale or use, without a 
refund on exports. 
The tax on an imported product should be determined in the 
following manner in order to ensure WTO compatibility: 
•  For those imports where the importer provides the carbon content of 
the product or the carbon footprint (using internationally accepted 
methodologies such as the ISO 14067), the import tax will be 
equivalent to the carbon content times the difference in price of 
carbon. 
•  For those imports where the importer does not provide the 
information on the carbon content, the carbon content of the product 
will be calculated using the ISO 14067 methodology. 
•  Finally, the EU has to take into account ‘different conditions’ in 
different countries. As Bordoff (2008) argues, failure to do so may 
violate the non-discrimination clause of Article XX chapeau.  
The Appellate Body’s interpretation of Article XX chapeau also 
suggests that the EU has to take the initiative to negotiate with other 
countries that might be affected by the EU’s carbon border tax. This was 
suggested in the US shrimp case. 
4.5  Conclusion 
This chapter analysed the WTO compatibility of a border tax on the carbon 
content of imports to the EU. The motivation for carbon border taxes was 
presented in chapter 3, which indicated that a carbon border tax and an 
associated domestic carbon tax are welfare-increasing for the world. Based 
on the theoretical model, we argue that our motivation for the introduction 
of a carbon border tax is not based on competitiveness and carbon-leakage 
concerns of the EU industry as mentioned in other studies. This has CLIMATE CHANGE AND TRADE | 63 
 
implications from an international law perspective, as the model shows 
that indeed the measure (border tax) serves its purpose (to combat climate 
change). 
We examined the current GATT rules and WTO case law to 
determine the appropriate design of a potential EU carbon border tax. The 
complexity of this legal case makes it difficult to determine whether such a 
border measure would be WTO-compliant. As discussed above, there are 
several articles of GATT that one has to take into account to avoid being 
found in violation of GATT rules. Although there are no rulings on carbon-
motivated border measures, WTO case law suggests that the WTO has been 
adjusting to rising demands from the climate change community to 
consider using trade measures to aid climate change mitigation.  
We show that carbon border tax (with no export refund) can be WTO-
compatible if it does not discriminate between the foreign product and the 
domestic product and if it treats all WTO members equally. The key 
condition is that WTO rules (Article XX) provide certain exceptions to the 
general prohibition to impose import taxes. One admissible justification is 
that the measure aims to protect ‘an exhaustible natural resource’. Since the 
stock of CO2 in the atmosphere is such an ‘exhaustible natural resource’, 
trade-related carbon measures can invoke this exemption as a 
justification.30  
One key difficulty the EU might face if it came to a WTO panel ruling 
on this issue is that the ETS does not ‘substantially’ cover all domestic 
sources of GHG emissions. However, the EU could argue that it has taken a 
commitment on total CO2 emissions (which account for most of all GHG 
emissions in the EU) and that its policies thus cover substantially all 
sources of emissions. 
A further key aspect of invoking the exemption under Article XX of 
the WTO is that the EU must make a good faith effort to negotiate other 
solutions with the contracting parties (which include all major emerging 
markets except Russia) before proceeding to impose border measures.  
                                                      
30 This interpretation would seem to be strengthened by the fact that the United 
Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), whose aim is to 
combat climate change, has been ratified by almost all countries. Many statements 
from all global fora have also repeatedly documented the consensus that fighting 
climate change is an important global policy objective.  64 | COMPATIBILITY OF CARBON BORDER MEASURES WITH WTO RULES 
 
Box 4.6 Superfund chemical excises 
The United States Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act of 1986 
created a system of taxes to fund the clean-up of toxic waste disposal sites, 
including a petroleum products excise, a corporate income tax surcharge and a 
system of excises on taxable chemicals and substances. The main features of the 
Superfund tax scheme are as follows: 
•  The Superfund chemical excises apply to the sale or use of the 
enumerated chemicals in the US. As a result, the taxes are subject to BTAs 
appropriate to a tax on consumption collected at the level of the 
manufacturer. Imports are taxed on the first sale or use by the importer, 
and any tax previously collected on exports is rebated. Because the tax is 
collected on the first domestic sale or use, a rebate of tax on export is not 
always necessary. 
•  The BTAs apply not only to taxable chemicals enumerated in 26 USCA 
4661, but also to untaxed chemicals manufactured using taxed chemicals 
as a feedstock. These chemicals are referred to in the tax code as ‘taxable 
substances’. The Superfund tax applies no domestic tax to taxable 
substances. BTAs were created on taxable substances equal to the tax paid 
on the taxable chemicals used to manufacture those substances. 
•  Taxable substances are of two types: 1) substances on an initial list 
contained in the statute and 2) substances approved by the Secretary of 
the Treasury under an application process created by the statute. To be 
approved as a taxable substance, the taxpayer must establish that taxable 
chemicals constitute at least 50% of the chemicals used to produce that 
substance, by either weight or value. 
Import-side: When a taxable substance is imported, a tax is imposed on 
the importer at the first sale or use. There is a three-tier system for determining 
the tax rate on an imported taxable substance. 
•  First, the importer may provide detailed information on the taxable 
chemicals actually used in the manufacture of the taxable substance. In 
this case, the tax is based on the amount of tax that would have been paid 
on the taxable chemicals if the taxable substance had been manufactured 
in the United States. 
•  Where the importer fails to provide such information, the Superfund 
legislation created two alternative systems for calculating tax liability. The 
US Treasury Department issues regulations stating for each taxable 
substance the amount of taxed chemicals used to produce that substance 
in the US under the dominant method of manufacture. Imports are then 
taxed based on the amount of taxable chemicals that would have been 
used to produce the good in the US using the main production method. CLIMATE CHANGE AND TRADE | 65 
 
•  Finally, where no regulation has been issued, a penalty tax of 5% of the 
value of the import was imposed. 
The measure of the amount of tax on taxable substances for BTA purposes 
is the tax on the materials used in the manufacture of the taxable substance. This 
tax is not pro-rated by mass, weight or value when only a portion of the taxable 
chemical is incorporated into the taxable substance, provided the taxable 
chemical has been consumed in the manufacturing process. Thus, the Superfund 
taxable substance BTAs are BTAs on the manufacturing processes, not on 
physical products. 
Source: Hoerner (1998). 
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5.  THE CRITERIA OF THE UN 
FRAMEWORK CONVENTION FOR 
CLIMATE CHANGE 
he previous chapter elaborated on the compatibility of the border 
measures with WTO rules and found that a border tax might be 
imposed if it is equal to an internal charge and is necessary to protect 
an exhaustible resource. The first condition seems to be easily met. The 
second condition requires some interpretation of what is meant by the 
exemptions provided in Article XX. We argued that any interpretation of 
this article must be guided by the global consensus that fighting climate 
change is an important global policy objective. 
A key aspect here is that the UNFCCC lays down the principle of 
“common but differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities” 
(Article 4.1). This means that developed countries have more responsibility 
than developing countries and should take a lead in climate action. 
Developing countries argue that the differentiation part of the principle 
only applies to the relations between developed and developing countries. 
This argument is based on the current structure of the Convention dividing 
countries into two groups (i.e. Annex I – developed countries plus 
economies in transition – and non-Annex I countries). Some countries 
argue for a revision of the structure to more accurately reflect the current 
conditions for a post-2012 regime.  
Nevertheless, this principle does not prevent countries from taking 
their own actions, regardless of the classification. The Convention also 
declares that both developed and developing countries make general 
commitments including the adoption of national policies and measures on 
mitigation (Article 4.2(a)). Already not only developed countries but also 
developing countries are implementing domestic policies and measures for 
T CLIMATE CHANGE AND TRADE | 67 
 
mitigation. By imposing costs on industry and consumers, these actions 
create a shadow carbon price. In a world without a global cap-and-trade or 
a common indicator acceptable to emerging economies, such a carbon price 
could play an important role in comparison to efforts to measure their 
equivalence. 
5.1  Key indicators for climate change 
The UNFCCC principle introduces two key criteria that guide countries’ 
commitments to climate actions: responsibility and capability. There are 
other equally important criteria (e.g. equity and simplicity). This report 
however concentrates on the UNFCCC principles. The responsibility 
criterion can be translated into several key pieces of data and indicators. 
The most essential data for climate change are emissions (e.g. all GHGs or 
CO2 only; historical, actual or projected), population and production (e.g. 
GDP). Key indicators are derived from a combination of these data, e.g. per 
capita emissions, GHG or CO2 intensity (emissions per unit of GDP). 
The simplest way to translate the capability criterion would be to 
consider wealth (e.g. GDP or GDP per capita). The UNDP has developed 
composite indices, Human Development Indices (HDI).31 The Millennium 
Development Goals (MDGs) also specify a number of poverty indicators.32  
We examine below three examples – historical emissions, per capita 
emissions and CO2 intensity – that highlight different types of difficulties 
associated with the choice of an indicator: for historical emissions, the 
retrospective identification of a GHG as a pollutant; for per capita 
emissions, the risk of creating a bias towards certain economic and social 
models; and for CO2 intensity, environmental uncertainty.  
Comparing responsibility and targets expressed with different or 
even with the same indicators is additionally hampered by data 
inconsistencies. Various sources base their indicators on different concepts 
in terms of which gases are considered (CO2 versus all GHGs, etc.), and 
which emitting sources (industrial, land use, etc.) to include. The bulk of 
                                                      
31 See the website of the UN Development programme 
(http://hdr.undp.org/en/statistics/). 
32 On the MDGs, see the World Bank’s website 
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the literature is fuzzy on these questions, resulting in many different claims 
and counterclaims. Not surprisingly, most countries emphasise the type of 
emissions data that best supports their (perceived) national interests.  
CO2 is often used as a proxy for total GHG emissions, as it is the most 
important greenhouse gas and holds the largest share of GHG emissions 
(see Box 1.1). However, whether CO2 emissions from LULUCF are omitted 
or not makes a substantial difference (see e.g. Figure 5.1 and Figure 1.1). It 
m u s t  a l w a y s  b e  k e p t  i n  m i n d  t h a t  the shares of emissions from certain 
gases, e.g. CO2, and sources, e.g. LULUCF or fossil fuel use, are different 
for each country and do not coincide with those shown in Figure 1.1 for the 
whole world.  
Additional methodological problems include the lack of accurate data 
collection in many countries and differences in approaches to computing 
emissions of the same type. These often lead to discrepancies between 
database sources and have spurred a call for stricter and transparent 
emissions accounting rules (see, for example, European Commission, 
2010b). The Kyoto Protocol required only Annex I countries to conform to 
the common methodology and metric in their ‘national communications 
and inventories’. These data issues are usually denoted under the rubric 
‘monitoring, reporting and verification (MRV)’. Among Annex I countries 
MRV is no longer an issue. However, the major non-Annex I countries have 
so far not subscribed to MRV obligations. The accuracy of data from these 
countries might thus be subject to doubts and discussions for some time to 
come. 
Since data on CO2 emissions from fossil fuel combustion are the most 
widely available, we have therefore selected them for the comparisons in 
Figures 5.1 and 5.2. CO2 emissions by the IEA do not include those from 
industrial processes that do not involve energy-related uses of fossil fuels, 
such as cement production (see Figure 1.1), which constitutes 
approximately 4.5% of CO2 emissions in the World in 2006, but 3% in the 
EU and 9.6% in China.33 
                                                      
33 Calculations based on data from CAIT 7.0, (Climate Analysis Indicators Tool), a 
comprehensive and comparable database of greenhouse gas emissions data 
(including all major sources and sinks) and other climate-relevant indicators 
developed by the World Resources Institute (WRI) (see http://cait.wri.org/). CLIMATE CHANGE AND TRADE | 69 
 
5.1.1  The stock of historical emissions  
Historical emissions matter because climate change is a stock problem. 
Climate impacts are caused by concentrations, not emissions of GHGs in 
the atmosphere. GHGs typically stay in the atmosphere for 100 years. This 
means, for example, that historical emissions for up to the last 100 years are 
still responsible for causing climate change. Countries that started 
industrialisation earlier (e.g. the UK) have contributed a higher share of 
GHG emissions to the global GHG stock. On the other hand, GHG 
emissions at the time were not recognised as being a problem. 
Responsibility also changes when land-use change is included in the 
overall calculations. 
Countries with more recent industrialisation have a tendency to 
emphasise historical emissions, but this is already changing in countries, 
such as China, where the growth of emissions is so rapid that their 
historical emissions will become relatively large within the near future. 
5.1.2  Per capita emissions  
A country’s per capita emissions reflect mainly its level of income per 
capita, but the growth of per capita emissions depends crucially on its 
socio-economic development model. Developing countries follow a wide 
range of economic growth models. While China’s manufacturing goods 
export model is based on high-carbon emissions, this is far less the case for 
India, where the service sectors are relatively more important. This is why 
the CO2 intensity of India’s economy is about one third lower that of China 
(see also Table 5.2 below). The more important differences among 
emerging economies are, however, between the those countries with an 
important industrial sector (e.g. China, India and Indonesia), whose CO2 
intensities of GDP are much higher than those of most Annex I countries 
and others, like Brazil and Mexico, which are much closer to the bottom 
range of Annex I countries (however, this difference might be due to 
LULUCF, as explained above). As the focus of international negotiations 
has shifted to CO2 intensity, we discuss this metric separately below.  
Wide differences exist equally among Annex I countries. For example, 
the US and Canada emit 100% more per capita (and GDP) than EIT Annex I 
or Europe Annex I (see Figure 5.1). 
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Figure 5.1 Annual per capita emissions, by country, 2005 (tCO2e) 
  
1 Data from Land Use Change & Forestry not available.  
2 PFC, HFC & SF6 data not available. 
3 PFC data not available. 
Source: Based on data from Climate Analysis Indicators Tool (CAIT) Versions 7.0 
and 3.0, developed by the World Resources Institute, Washington, D.C. 
Most of the differences in the figure can be explained by ‘objective’ 
conditions such as GDP per capita, geography, power sector structure as a 
result of fuel availability and the structure of the economy or industry in 
question. Others relate to lifestyle and reflect societal preferences.  
It is clear that relatively poor countries tend to emphasise per capita 
emissions in international negotiations. 
5.1.3  CO2 intensity of the economy 
CO2 intensity is usually defined as CO2 emissions34 per unit of GDP. This 
measure is of course favoured by fast-growing economies, but it also has 
                                                      
34 CO2 intensity of the economy is usually taken as a proxy for GHG intensity 
( w h i c h  i n c l u d e s  b o t h  C O 2 and other GHGs). As a proportion of their GHG 
intensities, however, the CO2 intensities of various countries differ, because the 
shares of emitted GHGs are not the same as for the world total (see Fig. 1.1). Both 
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the advantage that it should be closely related to the economic cost of 
achieving certain targets. It is clear that the economic cost of keeping 
emissions merely constant will be much higher for an economy that grows 
at 9% per annum than for one that does not grow at all. 
For example, the EU’s target of reducing emissions35 by about 13% 
over the horizon 2005-2036  translates into an implied reduction of CO2 
intensity of roughly 2.4% per annum (or -30.7% over the whole period). 
This is the result of combining the fall in emissions (-0.9% p.a.) with a 
potential GDP growth rate of around 1.5% per annum on average.37 
For comparison, the pledge submitted by the US in the context of the 
Copenhagen Accord (emissions reduction “in the range of” 17% in 2020 
from 2005 levels 38) would amount to a CO2 intensity reduction of about 
3.2% per annum on average (or -38.3% for the period).39 This is because the 
potential GDP growth rate of the US is estimated to about 0.5% higher than 
that of the EU, i.e. at 2% per annum on average. Higher US growth rates 
would of course have to result in higher reductions of US CO2 intensity if 
the US is to attain its target. If both the EU and the US were to attain their 
targets, the outcome would probably be quite comparable (in terms of 
intensity changes), taking 1990 as the base year, because over that longer 
                                                                                                                                       
the CO2 intensity and the GHG intensity of the economy usually exclude CO2 
emissions from LULUCF. 
35 We assume a constant portion of CO2 emissions in total absolute GHG emissions. 
In this case the percentage changes presented in this section are valid for both total 
GHG emissions (absolute targets are announced in this metric) and for the CO2 
emissions (intensity targets have been announced in terms of CO2).  
36 The target of -20% from 1990 levels corresponds to -13.1% from 2005 levels (own 
calculations) due to the 7.9% reduction (EEA, 2009) achieved by the EU until 2005. 
37 Per annum averages are compound annual growth rates. GDP growth rates are 
own estimates based on the data and projections until 2014 by the IMF (2009).  
38 The US letter to the UNFCCC Secretariat can be found on the UNFCCC website 
(see “Appendix I - Quantified economy-wide emissions targets for 2020” at 
http://unfccc.int). 
39 For comparison, see the corresponding World Resources Institute’s estimate of 
US (-37%) and EU (-30%) efforts in terms of GHG intensity improvement 
(including LULUCF) from a 2005 base year under slow growth (Levin & Bradley, 
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30-year period, the difference in the change in emission levels (-20% for the 
EU, versus only -3% for the US) would be offset by higher US growth. 
One could thus argue that the US effort (at least going forward from 
2005) is more ambitious than that of the EU – at least in the sense that the 
improvement in intensity terms would have to be about 0.8 percentage 
points higher, compensating for the slightly steeper improvement by the 
EU since 1990 (see Figure 5.2).  
Historically OECD economies have been hard-pressed to improve 
energy (and emissions) intensity by more than 1% per annum. Both the 
EU’s and the US 2020 targets would thus require considerable efforts.  
Figure 5.2 CO2 intensity trends in selected economies, 1990-2006 (percentage 
growth from 1990) 
 
Source: Based on data from Climate Analysis Indicators Tool (CAIT) Version 7.0. World 
Resources Institute, Washington, D.C., 2010. 
Among mature economies, CO2 intensity might be a useful measure. 
But is it not clear whether one can compare this measure across emerging 
market economies whose CO2 intensity is currently much higher and 
accompanied by the potential for savings.  
For example, if China were to continue to grow at 9% per annum but 
to achieve only the pace of improvement in CO2 intensity (implicitly) 
planned by the EU of about -2.4% per annum, its emissions levels would CLIMATE CHANGE AND TRADE | 73 
 
continue to increase by more than 6% per annum. This would imply that 
over the 15 years between 2005 and 2020, China’s emissions would exceed 
its growth by more than 150% (and more than they have done over the last 
15 years). By 2020, China would then emit more than the EU, the US and 
Japan combined!  
The pledge recently offered by the Chinese government, in the 
context of the Copenhagen Accord, is closer to the intensity improvement 
implicitly promised by the US, as calculated above (-38%) (and would 
practically match it if the US potential growth post-crisis were higher)..40 
This Chinese target is to reduce emissions intensity (CO2 emissions/unit of 
GDP) by 40-45% between 2005 and 2020,41 corresponding to between -3.3% 
and -3.9% annually on average over 15 years. At the 9% annual growth in 
the example above, this would translate into more than a doubling of 2005 
absolute emissions (increase between 100% and 119%). 
In order to be comparable, commitments by fast-growing emerging 
market economies must thus necessarily be much more ambitious in terms 
of GDP intensity than those of mature economies if the 2° C target is to be 
reached. This makes sense if one considers that the abatement costs will be 
lower the higher the growth rate, and thus the rate of renewal of the capital 
stock.  
                                                      
40 The World Resources Institute has estimated the US intensity improvement at 
43% under higher GDP growth and 37% under lower growth, under its target of 
17% absolute reduction (Levin & Bradley, 2010). 
41 The official letter to the UNFCCC Secretariat reads that “China will endeavour to 
lower its carbon dioxide emissions per unit of GDP by 40-45% by 2020 compared to 
the 2005 level” (see “Appendix II - Nationally appropriate mitigation actions of 
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Table 5.1 Key statistics on selected Annex I parties 
Energy-relateda  
CO2 emissions 
Tonne CO2 
/capita 2007b  
CO2 intensity 
energy mix 2007c  
CO2 intensity of 
GDP 2007d  
EU-27    7.9    53.3    0.4  
Australia    18.8    76.3    0.78  
Canada    17.4    50.8    0.66  
Japan    9.7    57.5    0.24  
Russia    11.2   56.4    3.91  
Turkey    3.6    63.3    0.71  
Ukraine    6.8    54.6    6.01  
US   19.1    58.9    0.5  
a Total CO2 emissions from fuel combustion using the IPCC Sectoral Approach; excluding 
international bunkers and aviation. 
b Data from IEA (2009a).  
c Tonne CO2/terajoule of total primary energy supply; data from IEA (2009a). 
d kg CO2/$ using 2000 prices and exchange rates; data from IEA (2009a). 
Source: Data from IEA (2009a), table format adapted from European Commission (2009d, p. 
23). 
The UNFCCC’s crude categorisation of Annex I and non-Annex I 
countries hides huge and growing differences among the latter group of 
developing and emerging countries. India is a fast-growing emerging 
economy but has very low per capita emissions (a little more than 1 tonne 
of CO2 per capita compared with about 4.6 tonnes of CO2 per capita for 
China, measured in 2007) comparable to a least developed country (LDC). 
Table 5.2 summarises the main data of major economies including 
emerging economies and shows a significant variance among them. Note 
that the figures for Brazil and Indonesia would be much higher if the 
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Table 5.2 Key statistics on carbon emissions in emerging economies 
Energy-
relateda  
CO2 
emissions  
GDP/ 
cap 
2007b  
Tonne 
CO2/ 
Capita 
2007c 
CO2 
inten-
sity 
energy 
mix 
2007d 
CO2 
inten-
sity 
GDP 
2007e 
CO2 
emis-
sions 
1990f 
CO2 
emis-
sions 
2007f 
Change 
CO2 
1990-
2007f 
Brazil    9,567    1.8    35.2    0.4    193    347.1    79.8%  
China    5,383    4.6    73.6    2.3    2244    6071    170.6%  
India    2,753    1.2    53.2    1.7    589.3    1324    124.7%  
Indonesia    3,712    1.7    47.3    1.6    140.2    377.2    169%  
Mexico    14,104   4.1    56.8    0.6    292.9    437.9    49.5%  
South Africa   9,757    7.3    61.5    1.9    254.7    345.8    35.8%  
South Korea   24,801    10.1    52.5    0.7    229.3    488.7    113.1%  
a Total CO2 emissions from fuel combustion using the IPCC Sectoral Approach; excluding 
international bunkers and aviation. 
b US$ per capita in purchasing power parity terms (PPP); data for 2007 from UNDP (2009). 
c Data from IEA (2009a). 
d Tonne CO2 /terajoule; data from IEA (2009a). 
d kg CO2 /US$ using 2000 prices and exchange rates; data from IEA (2009a). 
f Million tonnes of CO2 (MtCO2); data from IEA (2009a). 
Source: Data from IEA (2009a), UNDP (2009), table format adapted from European 
Commission (2009d, p. 24). 
5.2  Mid- and long-term global emissions targets 
It is important to reiterate and emphasise the ‘stock nature’ of the climate 
change problem, i.e. that GHG concentrations, rather than emissions, 
matter. Global atmospheric CO2 concentration has grown, rising from a 
pre-industrial value of about 280 ppm (parts per million) to 383.9 ppm in 
2008, essentially by 150 years of industrialisation. According to the IPCC, 
they exceed by far the natural range of the last 65,000 years. There is an 
emerging political consensus that the stabilisation level should be 
somewhere between 450 ppm and 550 ppm. This would translate roughly 
into a 2°C or 3°C increase in temperature, which is a range that many 
consider as ‘still manageable’. The EU set itself a target of 2° C. The level of 
the global target, whether expressed in terms of concentrations (i.e. 450 
ppm) or temperature (e.g. 2°C), has implications for the projected emissions 
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stock nature of the problem, early emissions reductions are beneficial both 
in environmental and economic terms. Or to put it differently, a delay in 
reductions would make it impossible to reach certain levels of stabilisation 
targets, and increase the marginal abatement costs as a result of a steeper 
future reduction curve. For example, a 3°C target requires the global peak 
some 15 years later, meaning that emissions need to peak far later for 
developing countries as well. For an overview, see Table 5.3. 
Table 5.3 Overview of commitments by regions for different target scenarios 
Scenario   Region  2020  2050 
Annex I  -25% to -40%  -80% to -95%  450 ppm  
CO2 eq  Non-Annex I  Substantial deviation 
from baseline in Latin 
America, Middle East, 
East Asia and centrally-
planned Asia 
Substantial deviation 
from baseline in all 
regions 
Annex I  -10% to -30%  -40% to -90%  550 ppm  
CO2 eq  Non-Annex I  Deviation from baseline 
in Latin America, Mid-
dle East and East Asia 
Deviation from baseline 
in most regions, 
especially in Latin 
America, Middle East  
Annex I  0% to -25%  -30% to -80%  650 ppm  
CO2 eq  Non-Annex I  Baseline  Deviation from baseline 
in Latin America, Mid-
dle East and East Asia 
Source: Gupta et al. (2007, p. 776). 
To date, governments participating in post-2012 negotiations are 
converging towards a long-term global target of a 50% emissions reduction 
by 2050 and towards 80% or more in 2100. For developed countries, 
halving global emissions by 2050 translates into an emissions cut in the 
range of 80-95% by 2050 and 25-40% in 2020 from the 1990 levels. By and 
large, even if developed countries make steep reductions (of up to 25-40% 
in 2020), it is without doubt that by 2020 or 2030 at the latest (depending on 
the target of 2°C or 3°C), emerging economies such as China, Brazil, South 
Africa and Mexico will have to reduce their emissions absolutely. It is 
indispensable that China will put in place effective GHG reduction 
measures in the future. By 2020, China’s emissions are expected to be 30% 
higher than that of the US and by 2030, emissions from China will exceed 
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will likely lead to further differentiation, e.g. developed countries (e.g. 
OECD), economies in transition (e.g. the former Soviet Union), emerging 
economies (e.g. China, Brazil, South Africa), most vulnerable countries (e.g. 
small islands) and least developed countries (LDCs). This means the 
extension of differentiation in allocation of responsibilities to the relations 
among developing countries. 
More recent research goes a step further than the IPCC (2007). Table 
5.3 shows that the 2°C limit target requires developing countries to limit 
their GHG emissions growth to 15-30% below projected baseline by 2020 
(den Elzen & Höhne, 2008, p. 260; European Commission, 2009a, p. 5). The 
European Commission recommends in its Communication on the post-2012 
regime (2009a, 2009b, 2009c, 2009d) that developing countries should aim at 
achieving the level through domestic measures alone.42 
Developing countries are not expected to take on absolute targets 
under a post-2012 regime. However, in Bali in December 2007, developing 
countries accepted to take on “measurable, reportable, and verifiable” 
national mitigation commitments or actions on the condition that 
developed countries would provide assistance in the form of financing and 
technology. Hence, developing counties’ commitments will remain 
confined to ‘unilateral domestic actions’ based on their national climate 
change or de-carbonisation strategy. This has been confirmed by the 
Copenhagen Accord.  
5.3  Methodologies for allocation of responsibilities 
The UNFCCC principle of ‘common but differentiated responsibilities and 
respective capabilities’ has been translated into works on developing 
methodologies to draw emissions pathways for different countries. This 
chapter looks at two specific proposals: the greenhouse development rights 
(GDRs) concept (see Baer et al., 2007; Kartha et al., 2008); and the 
Adaptation Financing Index (AFI) (see Oxfam, 2007).  
                                                      
42 This excludes reductions triggered by crediting of emissions offsets but includes 
a rapid decrease in emissions from tropical deforestation. This also excludes 
emissions from international aviation and shipping, which account for around 
4.5% (shipping) and 3.5% (aviation) of emissions from developed and fast-growing 
countries but represent the majority not under the Kyoto Protocol framework. 78 | THE CRITERIA OF THE UN FRAMEWORK CONVENTION FOR CLIMATE CHANGE 
 
The GDR framework defines a ‘development threshold’. Countries 
below this level are not expected to share the burden of mitigating the 
climate problem, as they have little responsibility for the problem and 
relatively little capacity to invest in solving it. Instead they are able to 
pursue their rightful priority of human development. With respect to those 
above the development threshold, the approach defines a burden-sharing 
framework based on the UNFCCC principle. As a result, the GDR index 
assigns obligations to contribute to the global mitigation effort – see the last 
column “Obligation (RCI)”. The analysis then is applied to various 
countries including the US, EU and emerging economies. The GDR 
framework does not make assumptions on whether the obligation is 
fulfilled through domestic action or through reductions abroad, i.e. 
purchases of emissions rights. Table 5.4 shows a comparison of countries’ 
or groups of countries’ shares in various indicators.  
For example, this framework calculates that the EU’s obligation 
amounts to 27.4% of the global mitigation effort. Under a simple metric of 
current emissions, this figure would be at 11%.43  To date, cumulative 
emissions of China for the period (1990-2005) amount to 13.8 giga-tonnes, 
which is not much different from those of the EU-27 at 17.8 giga-tonnes 
(and probably equal to those of the EU-15). 
The same approach would bring about quite different results if the 
exercise is repeated in 2020, by which time China will most probably have 
been responsible for more cumulative emissions (since 1990 at least) than 
the EU, and probably also the US. On a ‘business as usual’ basis, China will 
probably have been the source of more cumulative emissions than the EU 
and US together (but probably still somewhat less on a per capita basis). 
                                                      
43  In the year 2004, the global economy emitted about 49 billion tonnes of 
greenhouse gases (measured in CO2-equivalent) (IPCC, 2007). The EU27’s share 
was about 5.2 billion tonnes (UNFCCC, 2008) or 10.6%. Thus, without taking into 
account historical responsibilities related to past emissions, the EU would bear 
about 11% of global costs to combat climate change (see Behrens, 2008).  CLIMATE CHANGE AND TRADE | 79 
 
Table 5.4 Global shares of population, income, capacity, cumulative emissions, 
responsibility and obligation (RCI) for selected countries and groups of 
countries (%) 
  Population  Income  Capacity 
Cumulative 
emissions 
(1990-2005)  Responsibility 
Obligation 
(RCI) 
US  4.7  22.2  33.7  23.7  38.2  36.0 
EU-27  7.6  23.2  30.0  17.8  23.5  27.4 
UK  0.9  3.4  4.7  2.5  3.6  4.3 
Germany  1.3  4.5  6.1  3.8  5.4  5.9 
Russia  2.2  3.0  2.0  7.4  5.1  2.9 
Brazil  2.9  2.8  2.2  1.3  1.1  1.7 
China  20.4  10.0  2.3  13.8  3.4  2.7 
India  17.0  4.2  0.1  3.8  0.1  0.1 
South 
Africa  0.7  0.7  0.6  1.6  1.3  0.8 
LDCs  11.6  1.5  0.1  0.4  0.0  0.0 
All high 
income  15.6  59.1  83.4  52.7  79.4  82.3 
All 
middle 
income  47.7  33.5  16.5  41.1  20.5  17.6 
All low 
income  36.7  7.4  0.1  6.2  0.1  0.1 
World  100%  100%  100%  100%  100%  100% 
Source: Kartha et al. (2008). 
Another formula is the Adaptation Financing Index (AFI) (Oxfam, 
2007). This index focuses on adaptation. This index is based on four criteria 
(responsibility, equity, capability and simplicity) and respective indicators 
for the first three (excessive CO2 emissions from 1992 to 2003, 2 tonnes of 
CO2 per person per year44  and the UNDP’s Human Development Index 
(HDI)). It is important to note that the index covers only countries that are 
both responsible and capable and gives equal weight to responsibility and 
capability (50% each). For example, EU responsibility amounts to 32%, the 
                                                      
44 This takes into account the target of halving 1990 CO2 emissions levels (10.7bn 
tonnes) by 2050 and the average size of the global population from 1992 to 2003 
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US 44% and Japan 13%. While China has average per capita emissions of 
2.7 tonnes from 1992 to 2003, China’s HDI is low and therefore considered 
not to have the capacity to assist in financing for adaptation. 
Such indices are useful analytical tools to establish some numerical 
indicators for allocation of responsibilities to ultimately construct possible 
emissions pathways. However, they are not sufficiently tested or politically 
accepted to serve as the basis for target-setting in UN negotiations.  
5.4  Methodologies and data for comparability of efforts 
The principle of ‘common but differentiated responsibilities and respective 
capabilities’ provides a guideline for top-down allocation of responsibilities, 
but not more. Efforts to operationalise the principle typically collide with 
countries claiming the right to receive special treatment because of national 
and specific circumstances. 
It is fair to say that the discussion on ‘comparability of efforts’ with 
implication for ‘equivalence of measures’ among developed counties is 
more advanced and methodologically easier than the one among 
developing countries. A number of indicators could be used to narrow 
down the margin of error of what ultimately will be a political decision 
based on negotiations. Examples of such indicators include: i) per capita 
emissions; ii) GHG intensity (GHG emissions per unit of GDP) adjusted by 
climate, geography, industrial structure, population, availability of fuel or 
marginal abatement cost calculations; and iii) per capita GDP. The 
European Commission (2009a) proposed four indicators: per capita GDP, 
GHG intensity, trend in GHG emissions from 1990 to 2005 and population 
trends from 1990 to 2005.  
Developing countries fear that common metrics for comparability 
may eventually lead to a back door for target-setting, not foreseen neither 
by the UNFCCC nor the Kyoto Protocol. Generally, therefore, they are 
more relaxed with bottom-down approaches that would recognise and 
possibly reward voluntary initiatives of individual countries (see, for 
example, McKinsey & Company, 2009). On the other hand, there is a strong 
economic argument for major contributions of developing counties. 
Typically, marginal abatement costs in developing counties are 
significantly lower than in developed countries. Focusing too much on 
higher-cost developed countries will make total global compliance costs 
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A number of developing countries and some emerging economies, 
including BRICs, undertake considerable efforts to reduce GHG emissions. 
In many cases, such initiatives relate more to local pollution and energy 
security, or access to energy. These actions impose costs on industry and 
consumers. Hence, they create a shadow carbon price. Given that 
developing countries are not ready to agree on common indicators, such a 
shadow carbon price would be the second-best tool to compare 
‘equivalence’ in efforts of individual countries in a systematic way. 
Efforts of emerging economies such as China, Brazil, Korea, Mexico, 
South Africa or China are considerable and costly. For example, China and 
India regularly claim that they spend up to 2% of GDP or even more per 
annum on climate change. While this includes adaptation measures, a big 
part nevertheless goes into mitigation. Shying away from taking economy-
wide GHG reduction commitments – especially if legally binding under 
internal law – they undertake a wide range of domestic measures. Typically 
they include energy-intensity reductions, renewable energy targets or 
policies to insulate or retrofit the housing stock. Such measures are seen as 
being broadly beneficial to energy-security concerns. However, emerging 
economies tend to avoid setting GHG reduction targets in order not to 
jeopardise the use of coal for power generation and to avoid having to 
phase out politically delicate fossil fuel subsidies or tackle the transport 
sector, all of which are seen as vital for economic growth and social 
stability.  
China is but one of the emerging economies that is taking substantial 
measures. Its position on climate change has substantially changed recently 
realising that its current high-carbon growth model is not sustainable much 
beyond 2020 or 2030. Increasingly policy-makers are becoming aware of the 
links between climate change, energy security and air pollution policies. 
This materialised in China’s pledge in the context of the Copenhagen 
Accord to take voluntary autonomous domestic mitigation45 action. Thus, 
                                                      
45 All developing country pledges explicitly refer to Article 4.7 of the UNFCCC, 
which states that nationally appropriate mitigation actions are voluntary and their 
implementation depends on financial, technological and capacity-building support 
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according to the letter 46   to the UNFCCC Secretariat, China will 
“endeavour” to reduce its CO2 intensity (CO2 emissions/unit of GDP) by 
40-45% compared to 2005 by 2020. The pledge also includes increasing the 
share of non-fossil fuels in primary energy consumption to around 15%, 
forest coverage by 40 million hectares and forest stock volume by 1.3 billion 
cubic meters over the same time horizon. 
These actions are a continuation of the domestic policies and 
measures already in place (e.g. energy efficiency targets in the 11th Five 
Year Plan and the 2007 National Climate Change Programme) for 2006-10, 
including a target to reduce energy consumption per unit GDP by 20%, to 
raise the proportion of renewable energy (including large-scale 
hydropower) in total primary energy consumption up to 10% or to increase 
the forest coverage rate to 20% and to increase carbon sinks by 50 Mt over 
the level of 2005. According to the China Sustainable Energy Programme 
(2008), these measures will amount to 1500 Mt CO2-eq emissions avoided 
over five years. The World Resources Institute (WRI) in Washington, D.C. 
reports that China may be able to reach the target, as energy intensity has 
decreased by 1.8% in 2006, by 3.7% in 2007 and by 4.2% in 2008, and is thus 
close to the 4% annual goal (Seligsohn & McMahon, 2009). Some policies 
are comparable to developed countries’ actions. For example, the 
Renewable Energy Law from 2005 sets a legally binding 15% share of 
renewable sources in primary energy by 2020 and is supported by many 
incentives, including a form of ‘feed-in’ tariffs for wind (China Sustainable 
Energy Program, 2008). Wind power receives support of 0.7 yuan per kWh 
(about 0.5 US cents) (Yan & Jiang, 2009). More specific and operational 
objectives are stipulated within the various regulatory actions, in areas 
such as improving fuel economy in transport, energy diversification, 
reforestation and energy-efficiency enhancements in both power generation 
and end-use (buildings and household appliances). China’s National 
Energy Plan also sets a target of total nuclear power generation at 40 GW 
by 2020 (NDRC, 2005).  
                                                      
46 This and the other letters with pledges by China, India, Brazil, Mexico, Korea 
and South Africa can be found under “Appendix II - Nationally appropriate 
mitigation actions of developing country Parties” on the UNFCCC’s website 
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Similarly, the South African government has pledged, in the context 
of the Copenhagen Accord, nationally appropriate mitigation actions that 
would ‘enable’ a 34% reduction in emissions growth relative to a ‘business 
as usual’ trajectory by 2020, and a 42% reduction by 2025. It also confirmed 
the so-called ‘plateau and decline’ trajectory adopted in 2008 that could 
lead to around -30 to -40% by 2050 compared to 2003.  
In the context of the Copenhagen Accord, Mexico stated its aim to 
r e d u c e  GHG  e m i s s i o n s  b y  u p t o  3 0 %  compared to business-as-usual by 
2020, conditional on support by developed countries, and reiterated that its 
2009 Special Climate Change Program is expected to achieve GHG 
reductions of 51 MtCO2eq by 2012.  
The situation is different for India, with its low per-capita GHG 
emissions of 1.7 tonne in 2005 (1.1 tonne for CO2 only). Nevertheless, in the 
context of the Copenhagen Accord, India has made a pledge to reduce the 
emissions intensity of its GDP by 20-25% by 2020 from 2005 levels 
(excluding agricultural emissions) through domestic actions of a non-
binding character. This builds on India’s past achievements to partially de-
couple economic growth from the growth in GHG emissions and to keep 
pace with annual growth in energy demand at almost half the pace of 
economic growth47 in recent years. Further actions are envisaged, such as 
an objective of installing solar-power generation capacity of 20,000 MW by 
2022, mandatory renewable purchase obligations (a form of feed-in tariffs) 
and energy efficiency initiatives that are expected to reduce energy 
consumption by 5% by 2015 (Fujiwara & Egenhofer, 2010). In addition to 
mandatory energy efficiency standards and labelling, these initiatives 
include a domestic trading scheme of energy-efficiency certificates that 
covers large energy-intensive industries. This trading may to an extent 
develop into a shadow carbon price. 
This shadow carbon price is difficult to assess and in fact mainly 
consists of many different shadow prices in the various sectors. Typically, 
developing countries undertake sectoral policies starting with those sectors 
in which emissions can be monitored, policy instruments work best, and 
                                                      
47 Own calculations for the period 2000-07 that show 7.3% annual GDP growth on 
average and 3.8% annual primary energy demand growth on average, based on 
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there are benefits in terms of emissions reductions, energy security or 
reduction of local pollution. 
Consequently, assessing whether there is at least an implicit carbon 
price in developing countries is difficult and can be very tentative at best. 
One possible option for carbon pricing would be to assess and compare the 
costs of countries’ actions, for example, against standard costs curves such 
as the ones from McKinsey & Company and the IPCC. But that assumes 
that data are freely available. Based on such comparisons, one could make 
some very rough estimates on the costs of the measures. Divided by the 
estimated reductions of a measure, one could then estimate the cost per 
tonne of avoided CO2. Doing this in a bottom-up fashion for all the policies 
could give some indication of an average CO2 cost, or the shadow carbon 
price. While this methodology is necessarily very crude and may not pass 
WTO scrutiny, it nevertheless could serve as an analytical tool. A 
complication is that all emerging economies face big deficiencies in the 
collection of data as well as in measuring, reporting and verification (MRV) 
of emissions, which would require some capacity-building. 
5.5  Concluding remarks  
The UNFCCC lays down the principle of ‘common but differentiated 
responsibilities and respective capabilities’. This means that developed 
countries have more responsibility than developing countries and should 
take a lead in climate action. To date developing countries argue that the 
differentiation part of the principle only applies to the relations between 
developed and developing countries – not those among themselves. This 
makes it almost impossible to develop a global cap-and-trade system 
encompassing all major economies. Some attempts have been made to 
develop specific methodologies with key indicators for quantification and 
allocation of responsibility, e.g. the Green Development Rights (GDR) and 
the Adaptation Financing Index (AFI). 
On the other hand, this principle does not prevent countries from 
taking their own actions, and the UNFCCC even states such action as part 
of a general commitment by all countries. Hence, developing countries 
prefer unilateral – internationally non-binding action based on domestic 
policies and measures reflecting their own national circumstances and 
priorities. This explains to some extent the current large difference in the 
price of carbon. As long as these countries are not keen or unable to discuss 
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among themselves, the second-best tool could be found in a shadow carbon 
price. 
There are numerous climate change mitigation efforts by developed 
countries and a number of developing or emerging economies, such as 
China, Russia, India, South Africa and Mexico, which may lead to 
significant carbon costs and may possibly even provide a (shadow) carbon 
price. Although it is preferable to translate these actions into estimates of 
total abatement and associated costs, this would be possible only in 
exceptional cases and on a very tentative basis, given the constraints on 
data collection and MRV. To give a more accurate account would require 
better data, thorough MRV, and a more in-depth analysis of national 
strategies. 
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6.  ENFORCEMENT AND COMPLIANCE 
s Chapter 5 illustrates, both the UN Framework Convention on 
Climate Change and the Kyoto Protocol distinguish between two 
groups of countries:  
i)  developed countries and economies in transition (=Annex I countries) 
and 
ii)  developing countries. 
Under the UNFCCC, these two groups have common responsibilities, 
such as submission of national communications, but they also have 
different responsibilities. Only the former (Annex I countries) have taken 
on firm quantitative emissions reduction commitments under the Kyoto 
Protocol. This is likely to change for the post-2012 period. While Annex I 
countries are expected to accept bigger absolute GHG emissions 
reductions, emerging economies are supposed to undertake national 
mitigation actions to reduce emissions below business as usual. Developing 
countries’ actions would have to be binding and ‘measurable, reportable 
and verifiable’ (MRV) while supported by finance and technology by 
Annex I countries.  
This chapter discusses the compliance and enforcement mechanisms 
of the Kyoto Protocol for commitments by Annex I countries. Currently, 
there are no enforcement mechanisms for pledged domestic actions by non-
Annex I (i.e. developing) countries, and the commitments to robust MRV 
systems are so far also in a state of flux. It will thus first look at major 
Annex I countries’ Kyoto Protocol commitments and their progress in 
emissions pathways and then examine how the UN compliance mechanism 
or enforcement tools operate. 
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6.1  The Kyoto Protocol in the first commitment period (2008-12) 
The Kyoto Protocol is an international agreement to substantiate the UN 
Framework Convention on Climate Change (the Convention). The major 
feature of this Protocol is to set binding targets for greenhouse gas 
emissions from 37 developed countries and the European Community. 
While the Convention encourages developed countries to stabilise GHG 
emissions, the Protocol commits them t o  d o  s o .  T h e  P r o t o c o l  p l a c e s  a  
heavier burden on developed countries in terms of quantitative emissions 
reduction targets, but it also requires all countries to meet general 
commitments. 
6.1.1  Commitments, achievements and prospects for compliance 
Under the Kyoto Protocol, Annex I countries are committed to undertake 
reductions of six greenhouse gases: carbon dioxide (CO2), methane (CH4), 
nitrous oxide (N2O), hydrofluorocarbons (HFCs), perfluorocarbons (PFCs), 
and sulphur hexafluoride (SF6). The first commitment period lasts from 
2008 to 2012. Each party’s compliance with the targets will be assessed 
compared to GHG emissions in 1990 or, in case of ‘economies in transition’ 
(EITs), in the base year or period multiplied by five. Some countries can 
include in their 1990 emissions base year or period the aggregate GHG 
emissions by sources minus removals by sinks in 1990 from land-use 
change, i.e. taking LULUCF into account by calculating their assigned 
amount. 
Annex I countries, mainly developed countries and EITs, committed 
themselves to collective emissions reductions of 5.2% from 1990 levels in 
the period 2008-12. These cuts were divided within the group, for example, 
8% for the EU-15, 7% for the US and 6% for Japan.  
Table 6.1 provides the key data, which highlight a significant 
variance in Annex I countries’ commitments and achievements over the 
2008-12 period. It shows that among the Annex I countries, Russia and 
Ukraine are outliers, both in terms of their low level of GDP per capita and 
their huge reductions in absolute emissions (due to the collapse of Soviet 
heavy industry).  
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Table 6.1 Key statistics of selected Annex I parties 
 GDP/ 
capita 
2007a  
Ratified 
the 
Kyoto 
Protocol  
Total GHG 
emissions 
2007, excl. 
LULUCF and 
bunker fuels  
(MtCO2e) 
Change in 
emissions 
1990 -2007  
Kyoto 
target 
(1990e - 
2008-12) 
Distance 
from 
target 
2007  
EU-27c   34,118b 31/05/02  5,045.1   -9%   -     
EU-15d   40,066b 31/05/02    4,052.0  -4%   -8%    -4%  
Australia   42,864  12/12/07   541.2  30%   8%    -22%  
Canada   43,404  17/12/02   747.0  26%   -6%    -32%  
Japan   34,287  04/06/02   1,374.3  8%   -6%    -14%  
Russia    9,103  18/11/04   2192.8  -34%   0%    34%  
Turkey    9,422   -   372.6  119%   -    -  
Ukraine    3,100  12/04/04   436.0  -53%   0%    53%  
USf  46,674   -   7,107.2  17%   -7%    -24%  
a Data for 2007, US$ per capita, current market prices, from IMF (2009). 
b Population data from Eurostat; GDP data from IMF (2009) for 2007, US$, current prices. 
c EU-27 emissions data from EEA (2009, p. 9), includes Malta and Cyprus, which have no 
targets under the Kyoto Protocol. 
d The 15 states that were EU members in 1990 will  redistribute their targets among 
themselves, taking advantage of a scheme under the Protocol known as a ‘bubble’, 
whereby countries have different individual targets, but which combined make an overall 
target for that group of countries.  The EU has already reached agreement on how its 
targets will be redistributed. 
e Some EITs have a baseline other than 1990. 
f The US has indicated its intention not to ratify the Kyoto Protocol. 
Note: Although they are listed in the Convention’s Annex I, Belarus and Turkey are not 
included in the Protocol’s Annex B as they were not Parties to the Convention when the 
Protocol was adopted. 
Source: Based on data from UNFCCC website and database (http://unfccc.int/), EEA (2009), 
IMF (2009) and Eurostat.  
 
Among those on the list overshooting the targets (on the basis of 2007 
data), only the US did not ratify the Protocol. All others, including Canada, 
Australia and Japan, did. However, those likely to overshoot are with only 
one exception committed politically to make up for the excess emissions by 
acquiring offsets, either in the form of credits under the CDM (Clean 
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credits from countries with so-called ‘hot air’, i.e. essentially the group 
called ‘economies in transition’.  
Russia and Ukraine are the two countries with the largest amounts of 
excess credits (see Table 6.2). However, they have not been able to sell large 
amounts of their ‘hot air’. Several reasons are thought to be behind this. 
Delays in the required domestic infrastructure have played a role, as has 
the reluctance of the Annex I countries most in need of credits or offsets to 
satisfy their Kyoto commitments this way. It has also been suggested that 
Russia does not want to sell massive amounts of credits, preferring to carry 
forward its existing credits to future periods. 
A number of potential buyer countries in Annex I are known to have 
set up budget lines to finance these credits some time ago, but little is 
known about the extent of both the purchases already undertaken and 
those planned for the immediate future. However, there seems to be no 
reason to doubt the political will of most countries to honour their Kyoto 
commitment.  
The exception to this rule is Canada where successive governments 
have not taken any steps to ensure that the country can meet its 
commitment under Kyoto. Moreover, there seems to be a strong domestic 
consensus that the country is not willing to acquire the credits needed to 
offset the likely excess emissions of the country. Canada thus constitutes 
the only test case for the compliance mechanism under Kyoto. The key 
question now is what will be the consequences of non-compliance with the 
Kyoto Protocol.  
Formally Canada committed to reduce GHG emissions to 6% below 
1990 levels in the period 2008-12, equivalent to an annual ‘allowance’ of 
548.4 mega (=millions) tonnes of carbon dioxide equivalent (Mt CO2eq). In 
2007 Canada’s GHG emissions amounted to 747 Mt CO2eq, which is about 
26% over its 1990 emissions levels and almost 200 Mt CO2 equivalent 
(33.8%) above its Kyoto target (Environment Canada, 2009). The overall 
trend until 2007 was one of steady growth of emissions instead of the 
required decline (see Figure 6.1).  90 | ENFORCEMENT AND COMPLIANCE 
 
Figure 6.1 Canada’s GHG emissions 1990-2007 
 
Note: Recent fluctuations have been attributed to the demand for heating fuel during winter 
seasons, which has grown warmer except for the 2007 winter, which was much colder 
(Environment Canada, 2009).  
Source: Environment Canada (2009). 
For the moment the Canadian government emphasises that the 
country remains committed to its reporting requirements under the 
UNFCCC (and the Kyoto Protocol). However, given that mitigation policies 
have only been put in place in recent years, its focus has been shifted from 
the remaining years of the first commitment period (2008-2012) to the 
‘future’: the goal of a 20% GHG emissions reductions from the 2006 level by 
2020 and a 60% to 70% reduction from the 2006 level by 2050.48 However, 
such a shift in the baseline would not be covered under the Kyoto Protocol. 
This raises the question of how the KP compliance system will work in 
reality. 
                                                      
48 For more details, see the website of Environment Canada, a department of the 
Canadian government responsible for coordinating environmental policies and 
programmes (http://www.ec.gc.ca). CLIMATE CHANGE AND TRADE | 91 
 
6.1.2  How does the Kyoto Protocol compliance system work? 
The Kyoto Protocol contains a compliance mechanism (Article 18) in order 
to ensure that parties meet their commitments. Specific procedures and 
mechanisms were introduced in the first meeting after the entry into force 
of the Protocol (Decision 27/CMP.1). The Compliance Committee has been 
operational under this framework since March 2006. This committee is 
composed of two branches: the facilitative branch and the enforcement 
branch. The former provides technical and financial advice to parties facing 
difficulties in meeting their commitments. The latter ensures that the 
parties comply with their commitments. Compliance cases that can be 
currently brought before the enforcement branch are limited to matters of 
procedure or implementation (e.g. registry, reporting). To date there have 
been three cases – brought against Greece, Canada and Croatia as regards 
compliance in national inventory reporting, national registry and assigned 
amount. This has led to declarations of ‘non-compliance’, but the countries 
remedied the situation the cases were subsequently closed. 
A case of non-compliance with emissions targets cannot come before 
the enforcement branch until after the end of the commitment period in 
2012.  
Formally three major consequences for non-compliance are foreseen 
in the KP: 
1)  A country in non-compliance with the 2012 target has 100 days after 
the expert review of its final emissions inventory to make up any 
shortfall (i.e. to buy credits).  
2)  If the country still misses its target, it must make up the difference, 
plus 30% in the second commitment period after 2012.  
3)  The country will also be suspended from making transfers under 
emissions trading (i.e. the transfer of AAUs, CERs and ERUs) and 
within three months it must submit a plan on the action it will take to 
meet targets for the second commitment period. 
How would these mechanisms work in the case of Canada? Canada 
would not be much affected by being suspended from making transfers 
under emissions trading. However, the first two compliance mechanisms 
would have substantial consequences (if adhered to): 
1)  Making up the shortfall by buying credits. How many credits would 
Canada have to buy? An order of magnitude can be calculated 
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MT above the target. In this case Canada would have to buy roughly 
1,000 MT (5 times 2,000 for the five years 2008-12).49 The cost of this 
would of course depend on the price of emissions in 2013, which is 
difficult to predict today. Moreover, the question that will then arise 
is from whom would Canada buy these credits? Wherever they are 
cheapest? Via CDM credits? A good guess is that by 2013 (i.e. in the 
new commitment period) the price of emissions permits should be 
around $30, which seems to be the upper acceptable limit in the US. 
The EU price might be somewhat higher, but Canada would certainly 
prefer the cheaper US source. This would imply a cost for Canada of 
$30 billion (about 2% of GDP). It is highly unlikely that the Canadian 
government would agree to pay such an amount. 
2)  Making up the difference plus 30% in the second commitment period. This 
seems also difficult to implement: Canada would need to make up 
1,300 MT or 260 MT on a per annum basis. Taken literally this would 
mean that over the second commitment period Canadian emissions 
would have to fall by over 30% just to satisfy the country’s obligation 
from the first period. 
It thus remains to be seen how the Canadian case will be dealt with. 
The Protocol states that any procedures and mechanisms for compliance 
entailing binding consequences shall be adopted by means of an 
amendment (Article 18). Agreement on such an amendment has not been 
reached due to strong opposition, thereby weakening the enforcement 
function. This leaves the current compliance mechanism mainly operating 
in a facilitation mode. 
If, as is likely, Canada does not face any substantial financial or other 
penalty, the compliance mechanism of the Kyoto Protocol will have become 
a paper tiger.  
In summary the Kyoto Protocol currently falls short of acting as an 
effective and robust compliance mechanism in these respects:  
                                                      
49 This simple calculation also shows that the concentration on the ‘commitment 
period’ does not take into account the ‘excess’ emissions in the previous years. This 
does not make sense given the stock nature of the problem (CO2 concentrations 
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1)  No preventive action can be taken against parties that will most likely 
fail to comply in terms of emissions reductions before the end of the 
current commitment period. 
2)  There is no financial penalty or any consequence leading to the loss of 
credits, and the impact of suspension for eligibility in participating in 
flexible mechanisms will be unclear until emissions targets are set 
and available flexible mechanisms are identified for the second 
commitment period. 
3)  Whatever cases are brought before the enforcement branch of the 
Compliance Committee, the decision will not entail binding 
consequences until the Protocol is amended. 
6.2  Post-2012 discussions 
It is somewhat surprising that reform of the enforcement mechanism has 
not been a major issue during the preparations for the post-2012 regime. 
Instead the diplomatic action has concentrated on numerical targets and 
the size of financial transfers. Major developed countries have declared 
their short- and mid-term emissions reduction targets (see also Chapter 5), 
while developing countries insist that the Convention and the Kyoto 
Protocol allow them to stay clear from target-setting.  
Nevertheless, the term ‘binding commitment’ is widely used in the 
preparations for the post-2012 regime. But in reality it seems to indicate a 
political commitment, rather than something that could be enforced via a 
legal mechanism. As for the compliance mechanism, the relevant 
subsection in the negotiating text appears to be largely based on old Article 
18, Kyoto Protocol (see 1.1.2). At the time of writing, it is difficult to discuss 
the nature of the self-declared emissions reduction targets unless they are 
made legally binding under domestic legislation, as in the case of the EU. 
6.2.1  Ensuring enforcement of pledged domestic actions by developing 
countries  
Most non-Annex I countries are unlikely to take on binding emissions 
targets and will seek to maintain the existing flexible mechanisms such as 
the Clean Development Mechanism. However, advanced developing 
countries are finding themselves under pressure from developed countries 
and have become more open to pledging domestic actions and 
participating in international mechanisms that would reward their early 
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approaches under the Kyoto Protocol to developing countries, it may be 
worthwhile to expand the scope of our enquiry to a new flexible 
mechanism that could ensure enforcement of pledged domestic actions by 
more advanced developing countries.  
As envisaged under the 2007 Bali Action Plan (paragraph 1(b) (ii)), 
developing countries’ actions are called Nationally Appropriate Mitigation 
Actions (NAMAs). Taking the process one step further, some attempts have 
been made to develop new flexible mechanisms based on NAMAs and to 
reward early actions taking place beyond project levels, either on the 
economy-wide or sector basis (from key sectors of economy). A number of 
options involving sectoral trading, sectoral crediting and NAMAs crediting 
or trading, either separately or in combination, have been under discussion 
on the Convention track (AWG-LCA).  
If one of these options materialises in the absence of a comprehensive 
compliance system, an enforcement tool might be attached to this specific 
market mechanism. However, discussions on the Convention track (AWG-
LCA) suggest that in all likelihood there will be no binding consequences of 
developing countries’ under-performance. Thus it is likely that such a new 
flexible mechanism would be set up without detailing how enforcement 
tools work.  
6.3  UNFCCC and the Kyoto Protocol on trade measures 
The UNFCCC has a single stand-alone provision in Article 3.5 on trade 
measures,50 which was inspired by the chapeau of Article XX, GATT (for 
Article XX, see Chapter 4.2.2). The UNFCCC does not refer or defer to the 
WTO as the mechanism with the authority to interpret this provision or to 
assess the legality of trade measures placed by parties (Werksman & 
Houser, 2008). Parties have not resorted to using the dispute settlement 
process envisaged in Article 14 of the UNFCCC. In contrast to the 
                                                      
50 “The Parties should cooperate to promote a supportive and open international 
economic system that would lead to sustainable economic growth and 
development in all Parties, particularly developing country Parties, thus enabling 
them better to address the problems of climate change. Measures taken to combat 
climate change, including unilateral ones, should not constitute a means of 
arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination or a disguised restriction on international 
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UNFCCC, the original chapeau of GATT Article XX is supported by a 
number of specific provisions as well as the Panel procedures.  
Moreover, it appears that Article 3.5 neither endorses nor prohibits 
using trade measures equivalent to those in the Montreal Protocol or other 
agreements as a means of increasing the effectiveness of the Convention in 
terms of compliance and enforcement (Yamin, 2004). For example, the 
Montreal Protocol on ozone depletion identifies a number of trade 
measures: i) requiring parties to ban the trade of controlled substances and 
to implement a licensing system and measures to control the trade of 
products using these substances, and ii) banning the import of HCFCs from 
non-parties from 2004 and the trade in bromochloromethane with non-
parties as of 2001. Furthermore, trade measures have been introduced in 
selected multilateral environmental agreements (MEAs) including the Basel 
Convention on hazardous wastes, the Rotterdam PIC (Prior Informed 
Consent) Convention as well as the Montreal Protocol.  
Article 3.5 is one of the five guiding principles of the UNFCCC in the 
same status as the other principle on common but differentiated 
responsibilities and respective capabilities, Article 3.1. Nonetheless, it 
appears that the key principle on use of trade measures has been taken out 
from the original GATT context and subject to re-interpretation in the 
UNFCCC mind-set as the Indian proposal shows below.  
Under the UNFCCC and the Kyoto Protocol, developed countries 
commit themselves to minimising adverse economic, social and 
environmental impacts on developing countries when responding to 
climate change (Article 4.8, the UNFCCC; Arts. 2.3 and 3.14, the Kyoto 
Protocol). In this respect the UNFCCC does not mention trade measures 
(4.8) whereas the Protocol makes an explicit reference to effects on 
international trade as one type of adverse effects to be minimised (2.3). In 
the course of subsequent decisions and discussions, trade measures have 
been addressed in a broader context of Annex I countries’ implementation 
in general, and consequences of their ‘response measures’ in particular. 
Consequences of developed countries’ actions on developing countries 
matter. Not the other way around.  
The Indian proposal for prohibiting unilateral measures has received 
a wider support from emerging and other developing economies, including 
China, Brazil, Argentina, Venezuela, Singapore, and Saudi Arabia, and has 
met opposition from developed countries such as the US and Canada (IISD, 
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might be found upon return to clarification about interpretation of Article 
3.5, complemented by additional legal provisions and enhanced 
institutional arrangements. Since a dispute settlement process is not 
functioning in the UNFCCC, the Convention parties that are also parties to 
the WTO could take the case to the WTO panel. The WTO would then 
likely look to the UNFCCC for guidance on an appropriate standard for the 
comparability of efforts to reduce emissions as well as for an appropriate 
standard for an assessment of the compatibility of the trade measures with 
the GATT Article XX and UNFCCC Article 3.5 (Werksman & Houser, 
2008).  
From the UNFCCC perspective, there will be two challenges. One is 
how to agree on any interpretation of Article 3.5, given that the provision 
has been linked to a broader debate on adverse effects, as has been 
discussed. Another is who could provide such a guidance. 
6.4  Summary and concluding remarks 
Developed countries (Annex I Parties) have produced a mixed record on 
commitments and achievements, almost halfway into the 2008-12 
commitment period. Since compliance is assessed over the whole of this 
five-year period, it is premature to determine the status of parties’ 
compliance at this stage in a formal sense, and the economic crisis has 
added to the uncertainty of the outcome in terms of actual emissions. The 
available evidence suggests that in 2008 and 2009, emissions fell 
considerably, at least relative to 2007. Given that the recovery is likely to be 
slow, this implies that the crisis should have made it much easier for most 
developed countries to honour their commitments, especially given that 
many of them had already purchased substantial credits before the crisis 
started. For more details, see also the next chapter. 
There seems to be one exception to this, namely the case of Canada, 
whose recorded GHG emissions were in 2007 26% over 1990 levels and 
thus 33.8% over the Kyoto Protocol target. Canada’s behaviour will thus 
constitute a key test case for the compliance and enforcement mechanism of 
Kyoto. It seems at present that the country will not face substantial 
consequences for its non-compliance. This illustrates a key weakness of the 
Kyoto Protocol, which adopted a target-and-timetable approach without a 
robust compliance system or effective enforcement tools.  
The Kyoto Protocol’s overall compliance system is unlikely to be 
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Framework Convention and the Protocol foresee the creation of new 
flexible mechanisms such as NAMAs crediting or/and trading. NAMAs 
were devised as a concept to acknowledge pledged actions by developing 
countries. Enforcement tools for NAMAs crediting and trading would be 
facilitative measures that apply to developing countries’ under-
performance, but there will be no legally binding consequences of their 
under-performance. The decision over the modalities and procedures 
relating to NAMAs will take place only after a Copenhagen agreement is 
reached. The expected continuous lack of the compliance system or 
enforcement tools suggests that there will be no institutional framework to 
ensure enforcement of developing countries’ mitigation actions, except 
through a ‘carrot’ of assistance in finance and technology. 
The UNFCCC has a provision on trade measures based on the GATT 
Article XX. On the other hand, the discussion on trade measures has been 
framed in a wider context of adverse effects of developed countries’ 
response measures on developing countries, which resulted in a tension 
between the two sides. One breakthrough could be found upon return to 
clarification about interpretation of Article 3.5, to be strengthened by 
additional legal provisions and enhanced institutional arrangements. 
Looking ahead into the post-2012 period raises a fundamental 
problem for a partner, like the EU, that has undertaken substantial 
commitments and whose industry is paying a substantial price in terms of 
higher costs in order to honour the commitments undertaken. 
Sovereign states are always reluctant to submit themselves to binding 
international enforcement mechanisms. The weakness of these mechanisms 
in the Kyoto Protocol is thus not a surprise. The approach that has been 
followed by the EU (and almost certainly by the US as well) is to make their 
own commitments binding domestically. In the case of the EU, this has 
been done via EU directives which bind all member countries. Similarly, 
the US seems intent on making its own targets legally binding within its 
own constitutional framework – but also to avoid any legally binding 
international commitment.  
But what can countries that have taken their own binding 
commitments do to ensure that the rest of the world does not free-ride on 
their efforts? Border measures seem to remain the only effective 
enforcement mechanisms, given that both the EU and the US are the 
world’s two largest markets. 
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7.  CONCLUSIONS 
his study has focused on a concrete question, namely whether it is 
appropriate to use ‘border measures’ to complement a domestic cap-
and-trade system like the EU emissions trading system, 
complemented by some form of protection against carbon leakage. The 
point of view taken in this study has not been that of defending a level 
playing field for particular sectors. In our view the key issue is whether a 
carbon import tax is desirable from the point of view of global welfare. The 
main finding is that this is indeed the case. 
This finding in turn raises two practical questions: how can the EU 
take a decision to impose such a tariff and how high might it be? 
The response to the first question is straightforward: The EU exercises 
exclusive competence for all matters concerning the customs union. Any 
decision to impose a carbon border tax would have to start with an 
initiative by the Commission which would then need to be approved by the 
Council and the European Parliament. Approval in the Council would 
require only a qualified majority. 
The second issue, the size of the import tariff, is more complicated. 
The key question here is what rate of a CO2 import tariff would be 
appropriate if the aim is to maximise global welfare? There is surprisingly 
little literature on this question, as most contributions to this debate have 
focused on the impact of carbon border taxes on the competitiveness of 
specific industries (mostly those subject to cap-and-trade systems). The 
implicit assumption in most of the literature seems to be (see in particular 
Houser et al., 2008) that the tariff rate might be high for the exposed sectors 
(cement, steel, aluminium, chemicals, pulp and paper) but rather low for 
other sectors. As trade in the energy-intensive sectors amounts to less than 
5% of all trade (for the US, but also for the EU), it has often been argued 
that competitiveness concerns based on the distorting impact of domestic 
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carbon prices without border measures are exaggerated. However, most 
observers have concentrated on the few energy-intensive sectors covered 
by cap-and-trade systems, which has had the effect of obscuring the general 
equilibrium effect of a carbon price. The latter would affect all sectors in 
which energy or fossil fuels are used as an input. 
Some rough, preliminary calculations suggest immediately that a 
carbon tariff by the EU (or the US) could be much higher than the average 
most-favoured nation tariff rates of the EU (on average about 3-4%). Recent 
calculations by Weber et al. (2008) suggest that the total CO2 embodied in 
China’s 2005 exports (in jargon: EEE, or ‘embodied emissions in exports’) 
should be around 1,670 million tonnes of CO2, or over 30% of all Chinese 
emissions. This percentage corresponds roughly to the share of exports in 
the Chinese economy (around 35%). Given total Chinese exports in 2005 of 
around $760 billion, this implies an average carbon intensity of a little more 
than two tonnes of CO2 per $1,000 of exports from China. 
The next question is the level of the carbon price. This is very difficult 
to estimate. It is tempting to use the price under the present ETS. However, 
this price refers only to the present Kyoto regime and cannot serve as a 
guide to what would result under the post-Kyoto regime. In the post-2012 
period, it is likely that the constraint will be much tighter. The Kyoto 
commitment (of an 8% reduction compared to 1990 levels of emissions) did 
not represent a tight constraint for the EU (15), given that the collapse of 
industry in the former East Germany on its own caused a reduction of 
about 3-4% in emissions and the fuel switch from coal to gas as a result of 
electricity and gas market liberalisation also led to reductions in the UK. 
Moreover, the current recession, which is likely to affect at least three years 
(2008-10) of the five-year commitment period, is reducing energy use and 
thus emissions even further, relative to a baseline of 2% potential growth.51 
Some studies (for example, Amann et al., 2009; Spencer et al., 2010) suggest 
that the EU 2020 GHG reduction targets of 20% will be met by the 
emissions reductions as a result of the economic crisis. Consequently, the 
studies find – by and large – that a post-crisis 30% reduction target would 
                                                      
51 Emissions in the sectors covered by the EU ETS have dropped by 11% in a single 
year (2008-09) (for more information, see the European Commission’s webpage on 
“Registries and Community Independent Transaction Log” at 
http://ec.europa.eu/environment/climat/emission/citl_en_phase_ii.htm). 100 | CONCLUSIONS 
 
be required to match the assumed constraint for a 20% reduction prior to 
the crisis.  
Assuming that the EU moves to a unilateral 30% reduction target, the 
EU constraint would naturally become tighter again. Pre-crisis, the 
Commission had estimated that a carbon price of around the €40-50 per 
tonne would have been required to reach the EU’s 2020 commitments of 
20% reduction. Given that the crisis might have reduced the 2020 level of 
EU GDP by about 10% (at least compared to the pre-crisis expectations), 
one could argue that a post-crisis target of -30% should be equivalent to the 
pre-crisis target of -20%. One would thus expect that the above carbon price 
would be reached only if the EU moved to a 30% reduction target now. 
This would imply, at current exchange rates, about $50-60 per tonne. This is 
most likely too high for the US, where $30-40 per tonne has been estimated 
to constitute the upper limit of what is politically acceptable. Thus, taking 
$40 as a rough guide (or, roughly €25-30 per tonne), this means that a 
border carbon tax on Chinese exports (to the EU) would be a bit more than 
two times $40 per $1,000 of exports, or approximately 8-9%. As China 
upgrades the sophistication of its exports, this rate might come down, but 
under current conditions the average carbon tax could thus be very 
significant, much higher than the MFA tariffs currently applied by the EU, 
and certainly an order of magnitude larger than the modest tariff 
reductions that were contemplated under the Doha round.  
A comparison of carbon intensities across other countries shows 
immediately that in general the BRIC countries, which represent the major 
emerging economies, have a much higher carbon intensity of exports 
(ranging from about 1 tonne of CO2 per $1,000 of exports for Brazil to about 
4 for Russia) than OECD countries (around 0.5). This implies that the 
average carbon import taxes the EU might have to impose on imports from 
these countries would thus range from about 4% for Brazil to 16% and 
more for Russia, but only around 2% for any OECD countries without 
comparable domestic measures.  
It is apparent that the imposition of such relatively high tariffs would 
have important implications for trade flows. This is actually desirable as 
some trade flows incorporate substantial carbon. Nevertheless, it is clear 
that a first-best solution would involve action by major advanced 
developing nations. Tirole (2009a and b) also emphasises this point. So far, 
however, developing countries have explicitly ruled out making any 
binding commitments on caps. But there is reason to believe that the mere CLIMATE CHANGE AND TRADE | 101 
 
consideration of a carbon import tax by major importers could make the 
first-best solution actually possible. It is sufficient to consider the incentives 
for developing countries if the EU (jointly with the US) were to impose (or 
just consider imposing) a carbon border tax. At that point, developing 
countries would have the choice between taxing carbon at home or having 
it taxed by the EU at its border. The former would of course be preferable 
from their perspective because they could then collect the revenues. Just 
considering the imposition of a carbon border tax could thus be a very 
potent negotiating tactic which could lead to the first-best solution, namely 
stringent commitments to impose a carbon price and allow the full pass-
through of carbon costs by developing countries. 102 | 
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